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ABSTRACT 
 
 This thesis looks at the nature of violence with its endemic, and increasingly 
epidemic presence in Brazil.   I analyze the structure of the justice system, police force, 
and the many governmental security programs in order to better explain why Brazil is so 
violent and its government has been unable to control this violence.  Living under violent 
conditions, Brazil has become a society where the efficient functioning of the public 
sphere has been undermined.  This public space, shared by citizens, is what many 
academics believe to be a critical component of a robust and functioning democracy.  In 
Brazil, it is shown, this space is often absent as people are scared away by the violence.  
Furthermore, the question of whether or not violence is a threat to Brazil’s democratic 
system is addressed. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
Brazil is a vast country with a burgeoning middle class coupled with a vibrant economy 
that has managed to weather the global economic downturn.  In addition, the country has 
increasingly projected its political prowess both regionally and globally in resolving 
international disputes as far ranging as the nuclear program of Iran to the complex 
situation in the Middle East mediating between the Israelis and Palestinians.  
Additionally, Brazil is poised to become a major energy exporter in the century ahead, 
with the discovery of a large undersea oil field off its Atlantic coast.  All of these events 
are coupled with Brazil’s higher profile on the world stage in the decade ahead.  In 2014, 
the country will host the World Cup and then, subsequently, the summer Olympics. 
These games will be held, for the first time, in Latin America by Brazil in the city of Rio 
de Janeiro.  Only by understanding the underlying causes of violence is it possible to 
assess the robust and enduring nature of Brazil’s democratic institutions and the effect it 
has on civil society.   This thesis argues that violence threatens Brazilian democracy by 
eroding the vibrancy of its public sphere.  This happens because people distrust each 
other and violence further promulgates this distrust.  People feel insecure in the public 
sphere and thus avoid this public arena as place where they meet and encounter one 
another. 
In a bid to find out if the decline in security vis-à-vis violent crime in Brazil has 
had a negative effect on the country’s democracy, I have looked at various studies that 
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examine this subject.  Findings obtained by one such project from Paulo Pinheiro 
indicated that although the increase in crime rates and violence in Brazil had instilled fear 
among the citizens, the situation was not found to undermine democracy as he defined it 
for study purposes. (Pinheiro, 2002)  Pinheiro’s conclusion can be better explained by his 
treatment of definition of democracy.  If democracy is defined as having both regular and 
fair elections, then violence cannot threaten Brazilian democracy, given its mandatory 
voting regime.  However, if democracy is imbued with more requirements the way I 
suggest, violence then has the potential to undermine the vibrancy of the public sphere, 
thus cutting off the very place where democracy is legitimized. (Habermas & McCarthy, 
1985)  The political history of Brazil also lends a unique historical collective memory to 
Brazilian democracy.  This legacy still produces a fear that if its citizens pressure the 
political administration into police action, it will cause disorder and result in a possible 
return to a dictatorial regime. (Coppedge, 2002) 
 In undertaking my research study, I performed a critical research review of 
secondary academic sources and used theoretical frameworks established by other 
authors to support my findings and establish a theoretical foundation for my research.  
This study is a comparative study with previous academic research used to produce 
cohesive and clear deductions along with my analytical findings.  Past research projects 
on crime, violence, and insecurity in Brazil, as well as on how those issues impact the 
country’s democracy are reviewed. This encompasses sources like contemporary peer-
reviewed journal articles, as well as manuscripts and theses.   I also used primary data 
from the University of São Paulo/FAPESP Violence Program, The Fernand Braudel 
Institute of World Economics, and other research project data sets in order to support my 
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hypothesis that violence undermines democracy and degrades the robustness of the public 
sphere in modern Brazil. My approach thus concurs, and dwells on, the work of Brazilian 
political scientist Leonardo Avritzer, who wrote that in many cases, “democracy depends 
on the character and availability of democratic practices.” (Avritzer, 2002; 57) 
 This research then utilizes both primary and secondary data, along with 
interpretive analysis to form a conclusion. Supporting evidence includes, as I mentioned, 
previously conducted research studies, government statistics, and reviews from salient 
secondary literature sources.  All of this is synthesized to show that if mutual fear, 
whether it is a perceived or real threat, scares people away from public places where they 
freely interact and critically interchange their ideas and preferences about politics and 
collective life.  If democracy, subsequently, loses its most important place to be 
developed, namely a diverse and heterogeneous, yet inclusive public sphere, then 
violence is a menacing challenge to Brazil’s democracy.  Without this lively public 
sphere, democracy can ultimately neither thrive nor remain robust. (Habermas, 1991) 
 
Chapter Overview 
Following the introduction, chapter two of this thesis is focused around the issue of urban 
crime, with analysis concentrated on certain key factors that have led to its increase in 
geographically diverse regions of Brazil but mostly urban.  I then explore the impact that 
this increasing violence has had on the attitudes of a socioeconomic cross section of 
Brazilians.  This includes an examination of attitudes towards the appropriate levels of 
punishment, criminality, and policing. Recommendations given by numerous experts are 
analyzed in order to provide an oversight of what can be done to change the current 
 4  
situation. I further analyze the implications of urban crime on Brazil’s democratic system 
and establish the fact that the public sphere is critical for democratic consolidation.  
Without the proper functioning of the public sphere, democracy is directly affected 
adversely by this violence.  My hypothesis is that as the level of crime continues to 
increase, the quality of democracy in Brazil has been found to decline. This first part 
explores how this has occurred due to the lack of an active public sphere whereby these 
political and social issues are addressed. The second section examines the state 
institutions designed to promote public safety such as the judiciary, the structure of law 
enforcement, and the prison system. The third part looks at the reactions of the Brazilian 
state to curb crime in urban areas and explores the suggestion that the Brazilian armed 
forces should be called to fight crime alongside the police forces. Identified urban areas 
where crime has been on the rise include São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, and Recife.  
According to my research in this chapter, rapid and often unplanned urbanization has 
resulted from an immense increase in the urban population.  The phenomenon results in 
poor living conditions that profoundly influence the level of urban crime. Other factors 
that have led to the increase in urban crime include poor governance, an inefficient state 
security apparatus, and the lack of political will to stop crime due to its high political 
costs.  In the end, the state’s failings have caused the population, particularly among the 
elites, to support drastic and often undemocratic methods of crime control such as 
vigilante justice and targeted policing that often invades the poorer areas.  This has 
created a two-tier situation where the rich and poor live in separate yet parallel worlds. 
The attitude of the public towards the state is of mistrust and a lack of confidence with 
police officers being regarded as corrupt and incompetent, the judiciary as being 
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unreliable and the entire system as being flawed. This negative attitude has in turn forced 
the public to put up alternative security measures such as avoiding public places and 
seeking the intervention of the military.   
 Chapter three begins by discussing the history of Brazil’s institutions and 
particularly the influence of patrimonialism, capitalism, citizenship, and patterns of 
sociability that have had a negative effect on reducing the levels of violence in Brazilian 
society.  By looking at certain factors that have taken place in Brazil’s historical 
development, it provides a better framework from which to understand the legacy of 
violence and the root causes of this violence in modern day Brazil. By exploring specific 
elements that were critiqued by Bernardo Sorj, chapter three demonstrates how each of 
these elements has played a role in increasing crime levels in Brazil. In addition, I 
explore how these elements must be addressed in order to promote equality and safety for 
the public. These broadly discussed elements include capitalism, patrimonialism, the 
rationalizing state, social inequality, along with heterogeneity, citizenship, the non-
cumulative logic of organizations, and sociability patterns.  
 Chapter four expands on the issues surrounding violence and attempts to control it 
by organs of the state. These attempts at control are often implemented, while paying to 
heed or interest in a vibrant public sphere. I show, also in this chapter, that the police and 
other organs of the state act with impunity and are woefully inefficient in dealing with the 
problems that violence presents. A literature review was conducted to find out what 
experts believe are the impacts of race, gender, and class, and how these factors impact a 
person’s views on civil rights and thus the appropriateness of extralegal violence.  
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Chapter five elaborates further on the existing negative symbiotic relationship between 
violence and Brazil. In this chapter, the negative relationship is explored and it has 
certainly not cast Brazil in a positive light. At the very least, it brings to the forefront a 
problem that has plagued the country for more than a century The chapter also looks at 
ways the Brazilian government is trying to solve the problem of violence.  In essence, I 
ask the question of whether or not there has been real progress or just an illusion of such 
progress.  Implemented programs like community based policing and favela outreach 
programs are explored in this chapter.  In addition, the weaknesses of the Brazilian 
political system are exposed, which is seen as contributing to the inaction and inability of 
the state to control spiraling violence in certain sectors of the country.  The inefficient 
organization of the police forces and the lack of trust that many of Brazil’s poor have 
towards law enforcement and the judiciary I analyze.  With Brazil’s international profile 
being raised by both the upcoming World Cup and Olympic Games, the government has 
focused on poverty reduction and retaking control of some former drug-gang controlled 
areas in cities.  Many of these programs have been successful because they use 
community engaged policing and thereby establish a government foothold in poor urban 
areas.  The government has promised that it will no longer abandon large swaths of its 
cities to lawless gangs of criminals.  The chapter takes an in-depth look at how these 
programs function and a literature review has been conducted using analysis from experts 
like Luis Bitencourt and Claudio Beato as to the most effective Another focus of this 
chapter is to synthesize and evaluate the many ways the Brazilian government is trying to 
fight crime and violence on a local, state, and national level. Finally, the Conclusion 
provides an overview of the main findings reached through this thesis and then 
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synchronizes the arguments laid out in my work.  Violence is caused by multiple factors 
that stem from historical legacy, political inefficiency, and economic inequality.  If Brazil 
is to progress as a nation, the walls must come down and civil society must have a public 
place to interact and that public sphere needs to be reopened as the locus and primary 
place for debate.  A lot of information regarding the causes and solutions to the problem 
associated with violence were analyzed through the prism of different studies, yet 
politicians are generally unwilling to put themselves at the forefront and demand an 
investment in the implementation of these findings. This is the biggest area where the 
government of Brazil is failing its citizenry.  For Brazil to develop politically and socially 
in the coming century, basic problems such as violence and personal security must be 
addresses and resolved.  This is because the public sphere is the very place where people 
come together and try to solve problems and promulgate ideas to make their society a 
better place to live.  Without this public space in which to debate, people begin to lose 
trust in each other, and cannot trust their safety in this public environment.  Without this 
safe public place, society parses itself out into separate and unequal sub-societies with 
separate schools, neighborhoods, and differing transport systems.  All of this has the 
effect of producing two Brazil’s that don’t have this necessary interaction and lack the 
will and means to share a public sphere, the very place in which democracy is said to 
grow and be nurtured.    
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CHAPTER 2:VIOLENCE, LIFE, AND BRASILIDADE 	  
In 1940, only about one third of Brazilians lived in what we would now call an urban 
location.  By 2003, that number nearly tripled to over 80% of Brazilians resident in cities.  
The rapid nature of this urbanization has undoubtedly contributed to the poor quality of 
life in modern urban Brazil.  In addition, the poor quality of life contributes to the 
epidemic levels of violent crime in Brazil.  Coupled with ineffective government and a 
lack of political will and efficacy, Brazil has indeed become a very dangerous place that 
has largely abandoned its public sphere.  What I will discuss in this first section is why 
there is such a prevalence of violence in urban Brazil and what can potentially be done to 
change the situation.  In this thesis, I demonstrate that widespread violence affects the 
quality of Brazilian democracy because it undermines the quality of its public sphere. 
(Avritzer, 2002) Without a lively public sphere, democracy can ultimately not 
consolidate and endure. (Habermas, 1991) 
As one would expect, violence disproportionally affects young men.  A statistic 
that exemplifies this situation is that fact that “the risk of death by homicide for males 
between 15 and 24 years old is much higher than that of traffic accident.” (Cardia, 2000; 
1)  Since the mid 1980’s when Brazil returned to a civilian democracy, violence has been 
an almost daily component of life in its major cities.  During the past two decades, crime 
statistics in major Brazilian cities such as São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, and Recife have 
skyrocketed.  The populations of these cities, both the elite and the marginalized, have 
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become frightened and increasingly concerned that the state can no longer protect them.  
The police forces are seen as incompetent and corrupt; the judiciary unreliable; and the 
penal system flawed.  The situation has become so grave that in some places, criminals 
command more authority than the state.  This has spurred many citizens to request the 
intervention of the military in curbing crime and violence.  In addition, the middle and 
upper classes have largely abandoned public spaces and avoid them in their lives by 
living in fortress like condominium housing complexes that shield them from the masses 
on the outside.  As one analyst of this trend suggests, the “gated-community mentality 
has been spreading like a cancer around the globe for decades. Its utopian purity, and its 
isolation from the life of the real city next door, are grounded in the belief — accepted by 
most people today, it seems — that the only way to create a truly harmonious 
community, green or otherwise, is to cut it off from the world at large.” (Ouroussoff, 
2010; 87) 
Under these circumstances, where some believe Brazilian democracy may not be 
entirely consolidated, it is only natural to question whether urban violence has affected 
the political vigor of Brazil’s democracy. (Bitencourt, 2003) If a measure of a 
democracy’s vigor is its political vitality, as some suggest, Brazil’s democracy looks 
more energetic than ever. In the 2002 elections, numerous political parties and candidates 
were able to campaign at all political levels with complete freedom of expression along 
with vast popular participation.  The process was relatively nonviolent, trusted, and 
reliable. (Bitencourt, 2003) However, if one considers the importance of the public 
sphere for democratic renewal and quality, then violence takes on a new dimension and 
importance, as it has the potential to erode the very foundation on which democracy rests, 
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namely a vibrant public sphere.  Over the course of this study, I am thus seeking to 
explain, among other issues, the apparent paradox that exists between Brazil’s urban 
violence and the relatively peaceful elections process seen in the most recent campaigns. 
In this chapter, I assess the impact of growing urban crime on Brazil’s democracy. The 
first part analyzes the implications of urban crime in Brazil on the democratic system and 
established the importance of the public sphere for democratic consolidation. The second 
section examines the state institutions designed to promote public safety such as the 
judiciary, the structure of law enforcement, and the prison system.  The third looks at the 
actions of the Brazilian state to curb crime in urban centers and pays special attention to 
the suggestion that the Brazilian armed forces should be called to fight crime. In the end, 
I will prove that urban crime does not threaten the existence of Brazilian democracy, 
though it certainly impairs prospects for improving the democracy as such. 
 
Democracy and the Public Sphere 
Why should we bother examining violence when analyzing democracy? In what way can 
violence affect, threaten, or even undermine democracy? Before I can discuss the 
different aspects of violence in Brazil, the logical link between violence and democracy 
needs to be established and explained. In this section, I will endeavor to introduce the 
rationale that links violence to democracy.  To do this, I use secondary sources and 
theories of academics like Habermas and Avritzer, among others, to give a better 
understanding of the intersection of violence, the public sphere, and democracy.   
 Democracy, in some circumstances, can be seen as a regime where political elites 
regularly compete for the popular vote.  These broad ideas about democracy were 
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similarly posited by academics such as Schumpeter (1991) and Huntington (1997) in their 
books about democracy and the popular vote from back in 1991.  Less conservative 
analysts, however, expect much more from a democracy such as Habermas (1991); 
Avritzer, (2002); Arendt, (1977); Rueschemeyer, (1998); and Wittrock (2001).  To them, 
democracy needs a vibrant public sphere where citizens can meet and share their ideas 
and political preferences so they can freely discuss and refine them. In such a view, 
expressed, e.g. by a whole array of scholars under the headline “deliberative democracy” 
(Bohman, 1998), it is not voting that makes a democracy, but the ability to actively 
participate in the collective decision-making of a polity. Ideally, as Hannah Arendt had 
explained many years ago, citizen form a collective will by interacting in the public 
sphere – and this collective will then become institutionalized and translates into law 
(Reiter, 2002)). Also, as Reiter wrote, “such a possibility rests on understanding reality as 
socially constructed through interaction and speech.  The success of democratic change 
depends on the sufficient accumulations of ‘communicative power’, to overcome the 
current realities that are maintained by the use of power and violence.” (Reiter, 2002, 27) 
To these republican-minded authors, democracy is a system where the people rule and 
where the distance between those that rule and those that are ruled is minimal. However, 
for people, or citizens to rule, they need to find opportunities to interact, talk, have access 
to and interchange information. The only place where this can happen, according to 
Habermas, is in the public sphere. (Habermas 1991)	  
 Hence, violence has the potential of keeping people away from public spheres out 
of fear of violence. Violence also undermines public encounters and dialogue – as it 
creates an atmosphere of mutual suspicion that makes any meaningful encounter and 
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interchange impossible.    In the case of Brazil, violence does not, in itself, affect 
elections – not in Brazil, where voting is mandatory – but it can certainly undermine the 
public sphere and civil society.  In fact, as I had previously mentioned, this public sphere 
is the place where the deliberative aspects are democracy are supposed to take place.	  
 
Violence in Brazil 
 From the early part of the 1990’s, armed violence, insecurity, and crime have increased 
dramatically in Brazil. In the city of São Paulo, for example, one out of every twenty 
citizens were victims of armed robberies during 2002, that is a rate of 1,704 incidents 
daily as reported by The Fernand Braudel Institute of World Economics (FBIE). (FBIE, 
2003)  In 2003, according to the Brazilian Ministry of Health, the homicide rate in Brazil 
reached a peak level of 28.9 per 100.000 inhabitants, double the rate seen in 1980. Much 
of the violence, according to analysts, is due to social inequalities and high rates of 
unemployment.  Although most violence affects the poor, middle and upper classes are 
also affected by it, which has contributed to a perception of the poor as “the dangerous 
classes” (Reiter, 2003, 24).  Another disturbing trend is that an ever increasing contingent 
of journalists, mayors, and judges, along with union leaders have been wounded or killed 
in gang-related killings for threatening the schemes of organized criminal gangs and other 
powerful groups that often include politicians and business people. 
While violence has not spared any particular social group, it is in the peripheral 
communities of big urban centers that the phenomenon is manifested most intensively. 
For example, although the homicide rate in São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro in 2001 was, 
respectively, 54 and 59 per 100,000 inhabitants, it jumps to close to 200 per 100,000 
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when the object of analysis is the urban poor. (FBIE, 2003) These rates are comparable, 
and even exceed those of countries that have been plagued by ongoing civil war and are 
conventionally considered 'crisis' countries.  These countries include Colombia, Sierra 
Leone, Iraq, and Afghanistan.  Even during the worst days of Colombia’s drug fueled 
civil war, the murder rate remained at 52 per 100,000 people.  As is evident from the 
graph on the next page, Brazil remains a very dangerous place according to the statistics 
from the United Nations.  One sign of hope though, comes from a recent study in 2006 
that shows the overall homicide rate in Brazil has dropped almost in half.  By 2006, 
murder in Brazil per 100,000 people dropped to 25.  This can be attributed to the social 
policies of President Da Silva’s administration and the continuing strong performance of 
the Brazilian economy.  In the 5 years between 2001 and 2006, the anti-poverty measures 
of Lula’s government have show success, coupled with increased anti-crime and other 
security measures in Brazil’s largest cities.  While crime and murder are, relatively 
speaking, quite high in Brazil, signs are that progress is being seen and the following 
chart shows a clear drop in the number of murders in 2006 per 100,000 inhabitants. 
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Table A: Murder Rate Comparison Chart: 2006 
 
(Source: United Nations Economic Commission on Latin America, 2006) 
The high homicide rate is simply one facet of the violence in Brazil. Criminal 
gangs, acting with increased brazenness, have been responsible for episodes of internal 
terrorism and widespread panic. In 2006, for example, an organized crime group known 
as the First Capital Command or Primeiro Comando da Capital coordinated a series of 
bombings, which included the burning of buses and assassinations of law enforcement 
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officers in the city of São Paulo.  This was to protest the sudden transfer of some of the 
group’s leaders to a maximum-security prison in the interior of the country. (Branco, 
Dellasoppa, Zoraja, 2006)  These attacks, which lasted some three days, made the largest 
and most powerful city in South America grind to a halt.  The mastermind of the PCC, 
Marco Camacho who is known more commonly by him nickname “Marcola”, ordered 
these barbaric attacks, from within a maximum-security prison.  Using a cell phone, 
Marcola coordinated various attacks simultaneously, which caused the death of more than 
160 people, most of them innocent civilians. (Ahnen, 2007)  According to an article 
published in the Brazilian weekly Veja from 19 July 2006, “(the) PCC is active in all of 
the 144 São Paulo state prisons and had contracted several lawyers to act on their behalf.” 
(Reiter, 2008; 18)  The net effect of these attacks are compounded by the fact that most 
middle and upper class Brazilians have abandoned what is commonly called the public 
space and live in fear of the outside world.  According to Reiter, “to them, the excluded 
have indeed developed in to a different species and this post-misery class indeed projects 
an extremely irrational fear onto the minds of included groups.” (Reiter, 2008; 18) 
The reality of modern day Brazil is such that this violence, and the state’s 
inability to deal effectively with its causes, has allowed two parallel universes to exist 
concurrently.  Neither the included nor the excluded groups share much interaction with 
each other.  As Teresa Caldera so aptly wrote, “closed condominiums are called fortified 
enclaves.  The latter are changing the way in which middle and upper class people live, 
consume, work, and spend their leisure time.   They are changing the city’s landscape, its 
pattern of spatial segregation, and the character of public space and of public interclass 
interactions.” (Caldera, 2000; 258)  Hints of terrorism also characterized the assassination 
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of seven year-old Joao Helios in Rio de Janeiro at the beginning of 2007. This small boy 
was dragged for seven kilometers by a group of teenagers attempting to rob a car.  The 
young boy became the poster child of a nationwide protest against the high levels of 
violence in Brazil. (Branco et. al, 2006)  This incident only further illustrates the 
increasing levels of violence in Brazil.  This case also brought about some more soul 
searching and further questions about the Brazilian legal system. Today in Brazil, 
teenagers under 18 years old cannot be sent to an adult prison to pay for their crimes. 
Instead, they are put under the tutelage of the Brazilian state and sent to a reformatory 
organization where they are expected to receive education, psychological help, and be 
rescued from their criminal life. These institutions, ironically, seem to work as authentic 
schools of crime, where teenagers are frequently beaten and crowded in small cells. 
(Branco et. al., 2006; 22) When the younger criminals are released back in to society, 
they tend to be more at risk of being violent repeat offenders.  These reformatory 
organizations only seem to serve in promulgating additional violence as opposed to 
mitigating it especially among the youth. (Amir, 2009) 
 
Planting the Seeds of a Criminal Life 
The likelihood of poor teenagers joining criminal gangs has been growing in recent years 
in the faceless and poor areas of Brazil. Many of these youths, start their lives of crime as 
early as 8 years old.  In spite of the inherent risks of drug dealing, a growing number of 
youngsters have been joining in this activity where they are seduced by the possibilities 
of making considerable amounts of money in a short period of time. (United Nations 
Development Plan, 2005)  In the favelas of cities like Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, 
 17  
children and teenagers are supplied with machines guns and positioned at strategic points 
to monitor the daily movement of residents and to report any suspicious activities to the 
drug lords of the major gangs.  The criminal gang leaders seem to be successful at 
integrating the legion of delinquents that support their lucrative business of drug dealing 
in the poor favelas.   Criminal gangs like the PCC have been responsible for warlike 
scenes in São Paulo.  In Rio de Janeiro the situation is similar with the Comando 
Vermelho and others wreaking havoc in the city’s slums.  In fact, deaths by stray bullets 
resulting from rival drug gang disputes have become as common as terrorist-like actions 
by drug dealers. (United Nations Development Plan, 2005)  As Paulo Pinheiro stated, 
“…the growth of criminality in Brazil, like in South Africa and Russia, not only corrodes 
expectations for the future democracy but also legitimizes arbitrary violence, thereby 
weakening the legitimacy of the political system itself.” (Pinheiro, 2002; 117) 
 
Combating Violence Through State Action 
Former National Security Secretary, Coronel José Vicente da Silva Filho, recently 
remarked that the absence of effective intelligence and coordination among state and 
federal agencies in the area of public security have left room for gangs to develop a 
command hierarchy capable of organizing large-scale actions. In addition, they are able 
to field an army of experienced and well-supplied fighters who impose their authority in 
the slums and intimidate police authorities and dwellers of richer neighborhoods.” (FBIE, 
2003)  Other observers remarked in The Fernand Braudel Institute of World Economics 
study that they see the lack of coordination among the main obstacles to the effective 
combat against violence. (FBIE, 2003) They argue, for example that many times violence 
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is dealt with in Brazil almost exclusively in a reactive manner.  In this sense, as crimes 
explode in the media, authorities are quick to raise the budget for public security 
initiatives, announce national plans, vote on tougher legislation and put large scale 
operations in place in slums and other at-risk areas. However, there is little strategic 
planning and almost no coordination between the bodies carrying out security 
interventions, and those who plan them.  This limits the capacity of the authorities to take 
a real step toward a safer country. (Branco et. al.; 2006) This is the case, for example, 
with the National Public Security Plan (PNSP). The Plan, first launched in 2000 by 
President Fernando Henrique Cardoso and then re-launched by President Lula in 2003, 
has focused “too much on what needs to be avoided rather than what has to be done.  
While this helped the various agents of public security to detect the enemy and have the 
necessary tools to destroy them, it has not enabled those agents to engage in an efficient 
collective action that can yield practical and lasting results.” (Branco et. al., 2006; 187) 
 
The Police 
The state’s tools to promote public safety are organized into three systems that operate 
laterally and often at odds with each other.  These systems are the enforcement apparatus: 
mainly the police, judicial, and penal system.  All three systems are plagued with flaws 
and inefficiencies. Firstly, the enforcement apparatus is organized at two levels, the 
national and state level. (Platt, 2008)  At the national level, there is the DPF or Federal 
Police.  This is the main organization responsible for the investigation of criminal 
offenses that are either interstate or international.  Additionally, the mission of the DPF is 
to prevent drug trafficking, act as the police for the judiciary, and provide security at 
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international points of entry as well as at some government buildings.  Also, the DPF 
performs enforcement functions of a coast guards, air force police, and border patrol.  At 
the state level, the Military Police Policia Militar, Civil Police Policia Civil, and the fire 
departments are the agencies responsible for public safety.  They all report to the state 
governors and are organized along a military structure.  Operationally, these state police 
forces are supervised by the Secretariats for Public Security in each state and then 
coordinated by the National Council on Public Security (CONAS). As is evident, there 
are many complicated power centers within the police forces.   
These police enforcement regimes have been heavily criticized for their lack of 
adequate training, endemic corruption, and use of excessive violence.  There are several 
cases that notoriously link police members to violence, corruption, and death squads.  An 
example comes from July 19, 1993 in the northeastern state of Alagoas where sixteen 
members of the military police were accused of killing sixty-nine people.  Additionally, 
on July 23, 1993, eight street children were gunned down by members of the Military 
Police in front of the Candelária Church in Rio de Janeiro.  According to Bitencourt, 
“Police violence in large urban centers has reached the point that, in some regions, 
policemen are feared more than drug traffickers, who can ultimately pose as the real 
protectors of law and order.” (Bitencourt, 2003; 5))  In an ominous statistic, São Paulo’s 
Military Police killed 1,470 civilians in 1997, which was one-third the total number of 
homicides in the state. (Public Safety Project Report, 1997) The problem of corruption 
within the Brazilian police forces is at both complex and deeply rooted in history.  
Inefficiency and corruption are endemic to the system due to the fact the different police 
regimes are responsible for different aspects of law enforcement.  The police forces are 
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compensated poorly, lack non-governmental oversight, and they are not trained 
sufficiently well for the needs of policing that Brazil has. For example, the Civil Police 
are responsible for investigating most crimes yet the military police have the 
responsibility and power to arrest, detain, and this prevent crime.  While this division of 
power made sense when Brazil returned to democracy in the mid 1980’s, it is not 
efficient and is thus contributing to problems of corruption and a spiraling rate of crime 
and violence.  In recent years, there have been numerous attempts to reform the system 
but the police unions are powerful and there is a lack of political will to make changes.  
Once again, this is a clear example of formal democracy at work in Brazil yet substantive 
democratic function clearly lacking.   
 
The Judicial System 
Another area in urgent need of reform is the Brazilian judicial system.  There have been 
many initiatives, so far mostly unsuccessful, to reform the system.  These initiatives have 
been motivated by the widespread belief that the system, along with its procedures and 
organization, is flawed and cannot meet Brazil’s public safety needs.   As a consequence, 
ordinary citizens have become skeptical about the application of justice in Brazil.  They 
also believe that justice is unfairly administered by being easy on the rich and powerful 
while handing down harsher punishment to the poor.  Pinheiro wrote, “The judicial 
branch of government is perceived not as an institution that protects the rights of the 
under-privileged sectors, but rather as an institution responsible for the criminalization 
and repression of the popular classes. Accused black criminals consistently receive 
harsher sentences than their white counterparts, a fact that indicates racial bias in 
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sentencing.” (Pinheiro, 2002; 17) It is also widely known that many in the Brazilian 
judiciary have refused to try egregious rights violations in spite of strong evidence to the 
contrary.  Furthermore, most efforts at prosecuting the numerous police officials who 
have been involved in homicides and massacres are reversed.   
Since the early part of the twentieth century, the judiciary in Brazil has been in a 
perpetual state of crisis. In 1932, the chronic inefficiency of the then Federal Courts led 
to the end of Federal Justice in the country. The power was then devolved to the states 
and this has been the case for the past eighty years.  In more recent developments, the 
new Brazilian Constitution of 1988 placed additional burdens on the Judiciary adding to 
their workload and mission. Since then, the state of Brazil’s inadequate and arcane 
judicial system has continued to worsen.  With the opening of the economy, the 
establishment of political democracy, and the implementation of many inadequate 
policies by the central government have led to thousands and thousands of lawsuits from 
citizens. Courts clearly have not been able to respond to all these demands. 
From an historical perspective, the Brazilian judiciary is descended and modeled 
after the court systems of European monarchies where they were designed to be 
subservient to the power of the monarchy.  According to Luciana Yeung, “Even now, in 
the 21st century, all laws which define the structure and functioning of courts in Brazil are 
solely dictated by the Legislative and the Executive branches.  One needs only to 
remember the Constitutional Amendment Number 45, which institutionalized the so-
called Judicial Reform in 2004, as well as all the small-scale reforms in the civil law 
system.” (Yeung, 2009; 9) These aforementioned laws were the result of many years of 
discussion and bargaining in the Brazilian Congress.  These laws also had to be 
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implemented only after approval by the Congress and then the President of Brazil.  As 
such, any of these changes that were detrimental to either the power of the Congress or 
the Executive were not approved or implemented. 
Brazilian judges have traditionally come from the elite class.  Though this elitist 
trend among judges has declined in recent years, it still very remains the norm. A recent 
study carried out by Mario Sadek in 2006 shows that 85.7 percent of all active judges are 
white and only 13.3 percent are black or brown (pardo), while these same racial groups 
constitute 53.7 percent and 44.7 percent, respectively, of the Brazilian population. 
Moreover, 54.4 percent of Brazilian judges have a father with at least a high school 
diploma, with judges’ mothers having graduated high school 51.9 percent of the time. 
(Sadek, 2006) The 2007 National Survey carried out by the Brazilian Official Statistical 
Institute showed that, in the national population, only 28 percent of males and 32 percent 
of females are high school graduates. (IBGE Study, 2007)  In addition to the elitism seen 
in what can be called the judicial class, another characteristic that has carried out through 
history has been the close relationship between judges and the bureaucracy.  For many 
years after independence, the judiciary was part of the bureaucracy and not independent 
as it could be classified today.  Due to this historical legacy, many judges are still 
burdened today with administrative duties.  According to Yeung, “with the judicial 
backlog growing in recent years, it is even more unacceptable today that judges continue 
allocating a significant portion of their time to administrative duties. This inefficient way 
of allocating human resources seems to be one of the main reasons why Brazilian courts 
are inefficient.” (Yeung, 2009, 5) In addition to proposing modifications of outdated 
procedural and legal   requirements, the reform project of the Brazilian Congress is also 
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targeting many less than savory customs of the judiciary.  For example, at the 
institutional level, it contemplates the establishment of external oversight of the activities 
of the judiciary. Yet, although this oversight is to be only administrative and budgetary, 
most of the magistrates oppose it and view the project as interfering in the independence 
of the branches.  The project also recommends the creation of ombudsman offices at the 
federal and regional judiciary establishments. Finally, it proposes reducing the privileges 
granted to the servants of the judiciary system. For example, it recommends an 
experience prerequisite of at least three years before a lawyer can be selected as a judge. 
It also proposes the cancellation of the two-month annual recess granted to the judiciary 
system’s workers.   Another factor that affects the judiciary is that the elites often feel 
that the judicial system is “owned” by them.  The poor conversely, feel like it fails them, 
so that they tend not to trust judges.  (Avritzer, 2002)  This dichotomy helps no one and 
further undermines democracy in Brazil 
These changes, along with the difficulty the reform project has been facing in the 
Congress, are a good indication of the parochial nature of the Brazilian judiciary’s 
bureaucracy. This fact is even more remarkable if one observes that the project does not 
even touch on two other highly difficult issues. One, according to Bitencourt, is the 
extinction of Brazil’s tainted-by-corruption labor judiciary system (Justiça do Trabalho), 
a system particularly criticized by opinion leaders and nongovernmental organizations. 
Another focus of controversy is the prosaic nepotism widely disseminated within the 
judiciary system and thus considered a legitimate right by most judiciary servants and 
judges. Altogether, these facts communicate to society a poor image of the judiciary, 
which feeds the society’s distrust of its public safety system. (Bitencourt, 2003)  Overall, 
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the judiciary is far removed from everyday life in Brazil.  The judges are from an elite 
class and paid many times the wage of an average worker.  According to a 2007 survey in 
the Brazilian magazine Veja, the median salary for a judge was R$13,956 per month with 
a starting salary of R$12,700 a month.  Finally, with tenure, a judge can earn nearly 
R$260,000 yearly.  This is almost ten times the salary of even a starting lawyer that can 
expect to make about R$1,671 a month, initially and stands in stark contrast to the 
average Brazilian per capita income of currently 1,600 Reais (about US$960.00) and a 
minimum salary of 545 Reais. ("O ranking dos salários, 2007). 
 
The Penal System 
The penal system in Brazil is under the responsibility of the Ministry of Justice through 
the Conselho Nacional de Política Criminal e Penitenciária—CNPCP (National Council 
of Criminal and Prison Policy) and the Departamento Penitenciário Nacional—DEPEN 
(Federal Prison Department). These entities oversee the two main types of penal 
institutions in Brazil called correctional institutions and detention institutions 
respectively. The first type includes penitentiaries, custodial and treatment facilities, 
penal and agricultural colonies, and general correctional facilities. In total, Brazil relies 
on approximately 5,000 correctional penal institutions, including 51 correctional 
institutions 27 penitentiaries, 6 custodial and treatment facilities, 12 agricultural colonies, 
and 6 correctional facilities. The second type of penal institution is composed of military 
prisons, detention centers, and juvenile correctional institutions with 12 military prisons, 
1,580 prisons, 2,803 jails, and 5 facilities for minors, which are generically categorized as 
detention institutions. By the end of December 2000, 212,000 inmates were incarcerated 
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in the detention system. (Zaverucha, 2000) Given the chronicled wrongdoing and 
mismanagement of the Brazilian penal system, problems abound: prisons are 
overcrowded, riots are frequent, and violence and killings within them are common. 
Escapes, either by spectacular breakouts or simply by bribing prison guards, are common. 
In addition, as Fernando Salla observes, Brazil’s prison system is plagued by “torture and 
mistreatment of inmates…a lack of medical, social and legal assistance for inmates and 
an insufficient number of work and educational programs” (Salla, 2001; 8) Finally, the 
press reports that organized crime groups have been able to maintain command over 
criminal operations from inside prisons. (Salla, 2001)  With all these weaknesses, the 
penal system has become more part of the problem of, rather than the solution to, crime 
and violence in Brazil.  As is evident from the statistics, the number of deaths in 
detention facilities, prisons, and among young parolees remains disproportionately high.  
As Pinheiro stated, “Throughout the country, the impunity of state officials is virtually 
assured, giving support to those waging an unofficial war on the masses, which are 
thought of as undesirable and subhuman”. (Pinheiro, 2002, 117) 
 In this history of modern Brazil, no situation better reflects the problems caused 
by prison overcrowding that the Carandiru massacre of 1992.  To give some background, 
Carandiru Penitentiary was a notorious prison housing over 8,000 inmates in São Paulo. 
It was designed and built by Samuel das Neves in 1920, when it was considered a model-
prison to meet the new demands of the 1890 Brazilian criminal code. As time passes, the 
government failed to spend money on upkeep and the institution fell into a cycle of 
neglect and a state of woeful disrepair.  It was operational from 1956 to 2002 and, at its 
peak, was the largest prison in South America. In 1992, a massacre was triggered by a 
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prisoner revolt within the prison. The police made little if any effort to negotiate with the 
prisoners before the military police stormed the facility, as the prison riot became more 
difficult for prison guards to control. The resulting casualties were 111 prisoners killed: 
102 from gunshots fired by the military police and nine from stab wounds apparently 
inflicted by other prisoners before the arrival of the police.  None of the sixty-eight police 
officers were killed. Survivors claimed that the police also fired at inmates who had 
already surrendered or were trying to hide in their cells.  To this day, it is a shameful 
testament to the Brazilian prison system.  While, this episode caused many improvements 
to the penitentiary system, the underlying problems are still present, too many prisoners 
and not enough funding. (Varella, 1999) 
 
Government Reforms 
Despite the shortfalls, the Brazilian government has been attempting to make important 
progress in the sector of public security. The law 489b approved in May 2007, for 
example, facilitates the cooperation between municipal, state and national levels of 
government for initiatives in the area of public security. This is an important initiative to 
break what had been a battle for funding and a subsequent exchange of blame between 
the three levels of government. Another important initiative was taken in 2003, when the 
Brazilian Congress approved what became known as the "Disarmament Statute,” a set of 
measures to curb the proliferation of firearms in the country. One of these measures 
requires that the registration of firearms should be renewed every three years or there is a 
risk of a prison term that varies from 1 to 3 years along with heavy fines. While the 
attempt to outlaw the sale of guns to civilians was defeated in a national referendum in 
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2006, intelligent public policies and legislation such as the "Disarmament Statute" are 
already yielding positive results in the fight against violence. As a 2007 study by the 
Ministry of Health shows, the "Disarmament Statute" played an important role in 
reducing by 12 percent the number of deaths by firearms between 2003 and 2006. (Salla, 
2001) Also, the homicide rate has fallen in the last years. According to the Ministry of 
Health, the homicide rate for 2005 was 25.8 per 100,000 inhabitants and preliminary data 
suggested that for 2006, this rate had fallen to 24 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants. 
(Zaverucha, 2000) 
 What may be the most important advance in the area of public security is the 
government's encouragement of a new approach to violence, characterized by the 
involvement of civil society, partnerships with the private sector, and the recognition of 
the importance to control crime by preventing it.  Launched in early 2007, the National 
Program for Public Citizenship and Security Programa Nacional de Segurança Pública 
com Cidadania, allocated R$4.8 billion toward actions that integrate security policies and 
social interventions in the 11 most violent metropolitan areas of the country. The goal is 
to fight the social and cultural causes of the crime with a mix of preventive, controlling, 
and repressive actions, all of which will be coordinated between the national, state and 
municipal levels of government. 
 
The Costs and Impact of Violence 
While the advances that are being made in the public security sector continue to be 
promising, Brazil currently suffers enormous economic losses due to the widespread 
violence in the country. According to a study by the Inter-American Development Bank, 
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the annual cost of violence in Brazil is US$84 billion or 10.5 percent of the country's 
GDP, including public sector, individuals and enterprises expenditures as well as 
patrimony losses. The deficit of investment in public security has led to a boom in the 
private security business.  This private security business segment is one of the fastest-
growing sectors of Brazil's economy. In 2000, the Federal Police registered some 4,000 
firms with 540,000 employees offering private security services, along with many other 
unlicensed providers. (Human Rights Watch Report, 1996) 
While violence and criminality in Brazil may still be concentrated within certain 
geographic areas and demographic segments, its impact pervades all of the country. A 
recent survey has found that 59 percent of all residents of Rio de Janeiro do not feel safe 
when they walk the streets of their city. (Human Rights Watch Report, 1996) In Recife 
and São Paulo the percentages were 58 and 57 percent respectively. As violence and 
criminality is also an issue of perception, emotion, and quality of life, it is fair to say that 
Brazil's security situation is sufficiently precarious that it affects the everyday life of the 
country's citizenry. 
 From 1996-2000, the number of robberies in the State of São Paulo increased 
from just over 4,600 in 1996 to more than 5,400 in 2000. (Folha de São Paulo, 2000) 
Public concern about this spiraling crime has become the number one issue for the public.  
According to a study funded by Veja magazine, concern about crime has surpassed both 
interest in the state of the economy and inflation. (Veja, 2000)  Due to the existence of 
crime and violence in Brazil, especially in its largest cities, many residents have been 
forced to change their daily behavior.  An example comes from São Paulo and Rio de 
Janeiro where an estimated 47 percent and 51 percent respectively of respondents avoid 
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going out at night because they fear being a victim of violent crime.  Moreover, 29 
percent of Paulistas and 45 percent of Rio de Janeiro residents say they avoid certain 
parts of their individual cities in order to avoid high crime areas and the risk of being 
assaulted. (Cardia, 1999)  These statistics have caused interesting outcomes in Brazil.  
For example, “The lack of security of the common citizen has promoted and stimulated 
the sprouting of thousands of new companies of private security…In these companies 
were working 833,361 security guards, in other words, there were 60 percent more 
security guards than policemen in our country.” (Campos, 2005) However, and more 
important to the interest of this study, this fear of going out and the fear of encountering 
unknown others in the public sphere, threatens to empty out the Brazilian public sphere 
and undermine its democratic potential. 
 
Reactions and their Consequences 
Out of practicality and even desperation, the middle and upper classes in Brazil are 
increasingly looking to the armed forces as the solution to controlling the dual problems 
of crime and violence in its urban centers. (Zaverucha, 2000)  According to the New York 
Times, “even the simple announcement on October 31st, that the military would take 
control of Rio's police forces apparently was enough to cause crime to drop in the city, 
the nation's second largest. In the first two weeks of November, car thefts were down 10 
percent, bank robberies were halved and murders were down 75 percent from the 
comparable period in October.” (Brooke, 1994; World) Since this occurred back in 1994 
there have been a myriad of successes and failures when it comes to the military acting as 
a police force. There are two paramount reasons for not using the military to fight crime 
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according to experts. The first reason is immediately evident and practical, the armed 
forces are simply not trained or prepared operationally to combat crime; their primary 
mission is the defense of Brazil’s sovereignty in the face of external threats. The armed 
forces’ doctrines, training, equipment, and structure are not compatible with police 
operations; in essence, the military are trained to act decisively and with force. The 
military do not have the mandate or skills to conduct police investigations under an 
elaborate system of legal processes. Using the military for law enforcement purposes may 
result in the use of excessive violence and destruction, and it raises the risk of 
demoralizing the armed forces. Finally, the Brazilian military, as has often happened with 
the police, would be exposed to corruption should they assume crime-fighting functions.   
An example of what can go wrong when the army acts as a police force comes 
from 1997.  On November 22nd of that year, two soldiers were robbed of their guns near 
the Villa Militar de Deodoro, a neighborhood in the city of Rio de Janeiro.  The army 
decided to counterattack and the subsequently organized a military operation in Muquiço, 
a favela near Rio de Janeiro.  Having not found any of the stolen guns, the soldiers of the 
Eastern Military Command, wearing camouflage and ski masks, invaded twelve 
notorious favelas in their combat vehicles with blacked out number plates.  In addition to 
the Brazilian made Urutu armored personnel carriers, the soldiers even used an M-13 
tank for the invasion.  During these operations, drivers were forced to stop and identify 
themselves and were submitted to random searches.  In addition, women and school 
children were searched and many houses were invaded and searched without proper 
warrants or cause.  This operation was, originally, an exercise to find only a couple of 
stolen guns.  This use of overwhelming force, however, clearly shows that the military 
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are trained differently that the civil police.  It is not easy to underestimate the impact of 
using the military to combat urban guerillas. (Zaverucha, 2000)  The secretary-general of 
the Brazilian Bar Association, Ercílio Bezerra, released the following statement regarding 
the military invasion of the favela called Muquiço in 1997.  Bezerra states that 
The residents of those shantytowns in the specific case of this military operation, 
and in the same way this systematically occurs in conventional police operations, 
were treated as if they were convicted persons.  As usual, the constitutional 
principle of the presumption of innocence was disregarded because the people 
involved in the incident were poor.  [The defenders of the rule of law] demand 
that the public powers, especially the president of the republic, from whom the 
prerogatives were usurped, take immediate action to restore public order.” 
(Castro, 1997) 
What was so prescient about this military operation was that President Cardoso, at time 
remained silent on the issue.  The Governor of Rio de Janeiro also remarked that he 
believed the operation was legal though he did not gain any knowledge of the affair until 
after it had happened. (Zaverucha, 2000) 
 The second and probably more important reason why the army is probably not the 
solution to Brazil’s crime problem derives from the peculiar history of military 
interference in Brazil’s political affairs. In effect, 20 years of military dictatorship have 
had a strong influence on all Brazilian government sectors, and particularly on the public 
security apparatus, that has affected the structures and doctrines of public security as well 
as society’s perception of the issue. Without question, the military dictatorship that was 
in power from 1964-1984 is still a sensitive issue in Brazilian politics, and some critics 
remain resentful of the extraordinary command the military achieved over all sectors of 
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the country. Others even blame the dictatorship for having “militarized” the public 
security apparatus by creating a military police force and thereby institutionalizing state 
violence. (Dudley, 1998) Ironically, this is precisely why the police forces were broken 
up into civil and military police in the 1988 Constitution.  It is apparent that this is neither 
an efficient way of fighting crime nor an optimal way to have the police forces organized.  
As President Itamar Franco learned in 1994 when he ordered the military to intervene and 
enter some of Rio de Janeiro’s worst favelas, using the military is not an option that is 
guaranteed to work.  Enrique Arias wrote extensively on how criminals manipulate the 
local residents in the favelas so that they are less cohesive and unable to build effective 
networks to fight them.  In essence, the criminals also use internal conflict and “the 
specific structure of networks to undermine network cohesion. To succeed, therefore, 
network members must be aware of the problems they can confront and must work to 
keep communication channels open. Only through mutual cross-institutional support can 
networks overcome challenges from criminals.” (Arias, 2004; 31) 
According to Luis Bitencourt, however, this is not a fair criticism because the 
existence of military police under the command of state governments is an old tradition in 
Brazil.  It is true that in the period between 1964 and 1984, the military government 
incorporated these state police forces, both military and civilian, into the fight against 
what they termed “subversive activity”. Their involvement was based on the “National 
Security Doctrine,” which created a complex domestic intelligence apparatus. The 
resulting agencies, such as the National Intelligence Service Serviço Nacional de 
Informações—SNI and the National Intelligence System Sistema Nacional de 
Informações—SISNI had control over all federal and state government institutions, 
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including the intelligence collecting sections of the military police. Therefore, the 
military dictatorship established an apparatus that could directly control the military 
police organizations within each state. Control was exerted directly, through the IGPM-
General Inspectorate for the Military Police, and indirectly, through the intelligence 
system as military and civilian police forces participated in the SISNI. In short, through 
the Secretary General of the National Security Council Secretaria Geral do Conselho de 
Segurança Nacional- SG/CSN, the armed forces issued the general guidelines for national 
security, including public safety; through the IGPM, they exerted effective coordination 
and control over the military police forces; and, through the SISNI, they maintained a 
veiled control of the police forces while securing their authority over the intelligence 
organizations of the civilian and military police. (Bitencourt, 2003) 
This policing model mentioned previously, was not altered until then Brazilian 
President Fernando Collor de Melo became the second civilian to succeed the military 
dictatorship as President in 1990. In the first act of his administration, Collor dismantled 
the Secretariat for the Advising on National Defense Secretaria de Assessoramento da 
Defensa Nacional- SADEN and the National Intelligence Service Serviço de Inteligência 
Nacional- SNI.  By pushing the military back to its traditional role outside of the political 
arena, Collor gave back to citizens the right to exercise political power. Thus, he took 
apart the philosophical structure for the concept of public security in Brazil on which the 
military dictatorship had relied for more than twenty years.  All of this served to weaken 
and ultimately break-up the military controlled security apparatus. There have been some 
extremely positive developments in Brazil to address some of the problems that I have 
previously examined.  The Brazilian state is now more actively cooperating with civil 
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society.  Examples include a witness protection program that is being coordinate by an 
NGO in Recife.  This is due to the fact that many of the witnesses to violent crimes face 
extraordinary risks.  In other cities such as Fortaleza, Rio de Janeiro, and São Paulo, 
police ombudsman and ouvidoras were created.  The primary role of these entities is to 
receive citizen’s complaints and then demand an investigation from government officials.  
In addition, the federal government has encouraged the creation of these “ouvidoras” in 
all state capitals.  Besides these organizations, secretaries of state, judges, state attorneys, 
and governors have all contributed to the fight for rule of law. (Pinheiro, 2002) 
 
Governmental Actions 
In 1996, the federal government launched the National Human & Civil Rights Program. 
The Ministry of Justice, in cooperation with the Center for the Study of Violence at the 
University of São Paulo, prepared this program and defined its mission together with 
hundreds of civil rights organizations throughout Brazil who decided on 260 proposals to 
strengthen civil and political rights. This plan expressed the need to completely and 
unconditionally control endemic violence and structural violence against the poor, as well 
as the hunger and unemployment of the masses. In terms of immediate action, the 
program expressed the need to strengthen the rule of law in Brazil. During the thirteen 
years since its proposal, the majority of the proposed plans have been implemented, thus 
becoming a point of reference for the mobilization and organization of civil society, in 
partnership with state agencies to promote and protect civil rights. This is further 
evidence of strengthening civil society in order to deal with the endemic violence seen in 
Brazil. 
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Federal and some state governments are more often utilizing civil rights language when 
enacting laws.  Accordingly, the Brazilian constitution of 1988 has an authentic bill of 
rights and all of the international and inter-American civil rights conventions were 
ratified. Also, in the document, torture and racial discrimination were criminalized, as 
was carrying firearms without a license. Also, in a break from the past, the civil justice 
courts in Brazil now have the right to judge homicides committed by the military police. 
(Pinheiro, 2002) From an operational standpoint, civil society organizations like the 
International Red Cross Committee have trained thousands of military police on 
respecting civil rights within the framework of their jobs.  These are all positive 
developments for Brazil and shows and the further advancement of civil society in Brazil. 
 
Conclusion: Brazilian Democracy in Peril 
Since the return of civilian government in 1985, Brazil has been holding regularly 
scheduled elections for all its political offices.  In addition, popular participation is 
excellent and the process is seemingly efficient and reliable.  Corruption, which is 
endemic to most Latin American democracies, has been addressed in Brazil to some 
extent.  In 1991, President Collor de Melo was impeached and ousted on charges of 
corruption and this went a long way in strengthening Brazil’s democracy and its 
democratic institutions.  In the political campaigns of 2002, it is clear that they took place 
and showed no signs of weakness in the face of escalating urban crime and violence in 
the country.  Nevertheless, the issue of crime was of paramount importance during the 
election as all candidates pledge to stop the rise in crime.  This debate on crime and 
security was more heated in regional campaigns and in states most affected by urban 
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violence, such as Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo, and Pernambuco.  According to Luis 
Bitencourt, “because state governments have the primary responsibility for public safety, 
the political implications of crime and violence have been relatively limited to this sub-
national level and have not achieved a broader political impact proportional to the 
concerns raised in the news.” (Bitencourt, 2003) While the direct result of crime and 
violence may be geographically limited, this feeling of insecurity and lack of faith in the 
authorities can spread through the country and eventually undermine the political system.  
So while urban crime and violence pose no are serious threats to Brazil’s political 
structures and procedures, all of which seem to be functioning well, violence does affect 
Brazil’s public sphere, by making it impossible for Brazilians to reach collective 
decisions through inclusive, deliberations that typically happen in the public sphere. 
Furthermore, as the analysis of the different government branches has revealed, abuse 
and bias has undermined the trust in public institutions to the point where elites 
Brazilians think of the state as their private domain, whereas historically marginalized 
groups perceive the state as instrumental to their exploitation.  
As Luis Bitencourt wrote, “In contrast to a minimalist definition, a more complex 
concept of democracy entails consideration of the capacity of the regime to bestow social 
and civil rights, in addition to political liberties, to its citizens.” (Bitencourt, 2003; 13) If 
we look historically at civil rights in Brazil, it is clear that they have been impaired by 
poverty and inequality.  At the same time, civil rights have been impaired by a lack of 
protection against police brutality and violence.  As a consequence, growing urban crime, 
violence, impunity, and the inability of the state to provide adequate public safety, 
directly affects the prospects for improving Brazilian democracy.   
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Holston and Caldeira argue in their writings that civil rights in Brazil are not inherently 
guaranteed to all its citizens.  To those with the means and wealth, namely the political, 
social, and economic elite, civil rights are simply treated like entitlements.  To the poor, 
however, civil rights are just empty promises as there is neither security nor protection 
consistently provide by the state.  This is not to mention the clear lack of due process and 
the absence of the right to a fair and speedy trial.  Civil rights, according to the authors, 
are not rights but privileges reserved for the elites. (Agüero & Stark, 1998) These 
arguments are crucial to what I am speaking about in my discussion of the current and 
historical states of the judiciary, police, and penal regimes in modern Brazil.  In the end, I 
discuss these different branches of the Brazilian state to show that they do not work in the 
same way for all citizens of Brazil.  In practice there is no true equality for everyone, as 
class, race, and education make a difference in how you are treated by the legal, judicial, 
and enforcement mechanisms of the state 
This unequal treatment nurtures distrust in the state itself as well as politics as a 
whole.  It also undermines trust in public policies, and coupled with a divided public 
sphere, contributes to an undermining of democratic legitimacy.  If more is expected of a 
democratic state than the insurance of regular and fair elections, it becomes clear that the 
Brazilian state is failing its citizens by not providing the same amount of protection and 
security to all its population. 
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CHAPTER 3: THE VIOLENT LEGACY OF PATRIMONIALISM 
 
In the previous chapter, I have laid out the reasons why violence is so pervasive in 
modern Brazilian.  In addition to the state being inefficient when it comes to delivering 
the mechanisms necessary for effective public security, there is also a demonstrable lack 
of political will to make many of the political and social changes necessary to reduce the 
levels of violence in modern Brazilian society.  Besides these political issues, there is the 
social reality that there is endemic inequality and grinding poverty in Brazil.  In this 
chapter, I will look at certain factors that have molded the history of Brazil’s institutional 
development.  This provides a better framework from which to understand the legacy of 
violence and the root causes of this violence in modern day Brazil. 
 In the field of political science, there are many components that are said to define 
the roots of nationhood and what it means to be part of a given nation and its institutions.  
When taking such a holistic approach to analyzing and defining these components of, for 
example, Brazilian society, it is clear that Brazil is composed of many conflicting 
institutions.  These institutions, with their disparate aims and goals, are often in conflict 
with both their mission and nature.  The roots of today’s violent society in Brazil can be 
understood and defined by certain primary institutions according to Bernardo Sorj.  He 
classifies these elements as capitalism, patrimonialism, the rationalizing state, social 
inequality and heterogeneity, citizenship, the non-cumulative logic of organizations, and 
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sociability patterns. (Sorj, 2005)  Through these seven components, the basis of violence 
and it persistence are more easily comprehensible. I will, subsequently, use Sorj’s 
framework as a guide by which to begin the discussion of these institutions and how they 
engender the causality of violence in Brazil.  While some factors are more important than 
others, they all play a role in Brazil’s continuing struggle to become a more equitable and 
safer place in which its citizens can live. 
 
Patrimonialism 
In first analyzing the concept of patrimonialism, it is important to understand the very 
definition of the word.  For my research purposes, I define patrimonialism as a form of 
governance in which all power flows directly from the leader. From a political 
interpretation, this encompasses the blending of the public and private sector, which is 
seen correctly as corporatist. These patrimonialist regimes are autocratic or oligarchic and 
exclude the lower and middle classes from power. The leaders of these countries typically 
enjoy absolute personal power and often have a cult of personality built around their rule.  
With regards to Brazil, the word has been further expanded to describe the private 
appropriation of state resources more so than national patrimonialist leaders. .  These 
activities are normally done by politicians and public servants or by members of the 
private sector for their own benefit. (Sorj, 2005) There are many examples, but in the 
Brazilian context, examples are best seen when analyzing appropriations of capital for the 
construction of dams, river and harbor improvement, bridge and highway construction, 
and various government procurement contracts.  This kind of geographically targeted 
spending occurs in all political systems, but seems to be especially common in emerging 
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democracies such as Brazil. (Ames, 2000) This is normally labeled “ear marking” and 
“pork barrel”. More often than not, these activities tend to occur around election time as 
was evident in this year’s Brazilian Presidential election where many of the candidates 
were accused of buying favors or even votes indirectly. The idea of buying votes through 
paternalistic policies of giving to the lower classes has even been embraced by the center-
right opposition Presidential candidate Jose Serra who “has campaigned on the anemic 
slogan of “Brasil pode mais,” or “Brazil can do more,” indicating his support for the core 
policies of the Worker’s Party Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT) government, while 
belatedly adding a populist promise to raise the Brazilian minimum monthly wage to 600 
reais, about USD$360.” (Van Auken, 2010; 4) 
 The fact that this situation exists is in contrast the more ideal type of liberal, 
developed, and modern democratic society whereby the state is totally separated from the 
market and is an independent actor. (Sorj, 2005)  There are many empirical examples of 
this accumulation of power in the hands of some traditionally powerful families in Brazil 
including the family of former President Sarney and the Marinho family, whose members 
and friends are innately powerful while being well connected politicians.  In addition, it is 
a widely held outside assumption that the bureaucratic agencies of Brazil’s government 
comply with universal rules and norms of government.  In reality, they are supposed to be 
the channel for projects that are presented through political representations that are 
grounded in civil society.  This is, of course, not the case as the elite use and make the 
government work for them. 
  In a wide variety of historical literature, the concept of patrimonialism is most 
often connected with the so-called Iberian and Mediterranean world and the colonies that 
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they developed in the New World.  One fact is always clear; that for patrimonialism to 
survive, it must serve the needs of the groups it serves.  (Roett, 2010) Many social 
observers have concluded that patrimonialism is seen to a greater degree in societies 
where the distribution of wealth and power is unequal.  This is the case in modern Brazil, 
where power has often been concentrated in the hands of the elite. Patrimonialism is 
connected to not only the excess of violence in modern Brazil, but also to the country’s 
extreme social inequalities.  As I have shown on numerous occasions and in a myriad of 
situations, the countries elites often operate with total impunity in matters of justice and 
policing.  In many ways, by reinforcing social inequalities and tolerating this impunity, 
patrimonialism comes in conflict with the modern and progressive society that Brazil 
strives to be.  Additionally, it undermines the concepts of individualism and citizenship 
that are inherently important to modern democratic societies. (Roett, 2010)  
 In Brazil’s case, much of the inequality stems from the state’s inability to control 
or regulate certain societal mechanisms.  These mechanisms give the state the ability to 
enforce minimums that control a social infrastructure and thereby ensure all citizens a 
minimum standard of living.  In the end, the existence of patrimonialism undermines this 
function so it becomes a major source of inequality and its very existence undermines the 
value of democracy, individualism, and even justice in the case of modern Brazil. (Sorj, 
2005)    
 Throughout the late 19th and well into the 20th century, an unprecedented 
realignment took place in Brazilian society.  Simply put, power and population suddenly 
shifted from large feudal landholders to the growing proportion of individuals living in 
the cities and newly formed urban areas.  On one hand, social relationships in the 
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countryside changed profoundly, yet, on the other hand, patrimonialism in no way 
disappeared.  The political power of the many large landowners diminished and this 
ended patrimonialism in its traditional agrarian sense, but it remained ingrained in the 
national memory and just transferred to the new urban environment.  In the formal and 
traditional sense, patrimonalism by the 20th century was long gone and the system itself 
had little need to continue as society moved to the more urban environment. Ironically, it 
did continue and remnants of patrimonalism that are present in modern Brazilian society 
and are certainly well entrenched.  The Brazilian society of today can still be said to have 
difficulty controlling the tensions produced by the separation of the economic from the 
socio-political spheres. (Adorno, 1984) 
 Extralegal violence is supported in overt and tacit ways by the elites and middle 
class in order to control the masses, which are often of a lower class and darker color.  
This support often allows the police to act with impunity in the name of protecting elite 
society from the violent masses occupying the public spaces of Brazil.  This legacy can 
be traced back, once again, to the patrimonialist legacy of Brazilian society and its 
inherited history from the colonial era.  It is helpful to look at this legacy in different 
parts as Sorj did. (Sorj, 2005)  Firstly, there exists the patrimonialism of politicians 
whereby their own elected or appointed offices are used to gain personal economic 
advantages by exploiting public resources for personal gain and special privileges.  This 
is also compounded by the fact that the Brazilian political system is rife with nepotism.  
Furthermore, the civil service system, including the military and civil police bureaucracy, 
is plagued with corruption and they are confusing and often multiple centers of power 
and influence.  
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As I mentioned previously, it is commonplace for Brazilian officials to use their offices 
to secure kickbacks and bribes and thus exert control over the judiciary and control public 
expenditures.  In many ways, the power to control money is the power to control almost 
everything.  In interesting example of this comes from the state of Bahia, which Reiter 
termed the prototype state for the broader dynamic of exercising power known as 
Carlismo. (Reiter, 2008)  According to Reiter, “Carlismo, stands for the practice of 
clientelism and the associated logic of domination through paternalism as practiced by 
the last senator Magalhães.  But Carlismo is far from exceptional and reaches beyond the 
practice of senator Magalhães.” (Reiter, 2008; 343)  
 In further explaining the violent nature of Brazilian society how it became this 
way, it is important to delve into the arena of what can be called private patrimonialism.  
By definition, this is the appropriation of public resources by private agents and then 
generally overcharging the state in public bids. (Simpson et. al., 1989) This endemic form 
of patrimonialism is alive and well in Brazil and has spawned a class in itself that Sorj 
calls a state-contractor bourgeoisie. (Sorj, 2005) This paternalism magnifies the lack of 
efficiency in the Brazilian government. For example, elites do often benefit by obtaining 
low interests loans and never pay them back to the state. Companies, due to ineffective 
regulations, are able to release pharmaceutical have been awarded excessively generous 
judgments in juridical actions against state authorities or departments. (Erickson, 1977) 
 Finally, it is important to look at another phenomenon, which can be broadly 
described as a negative patrimonalism.  This is the use of power to discriminate against a 
certain social group or prevent that group from attaining any meaningful amount of 
power in their own right.  In Brazil’s difficult racial history, the use of political power has 
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often been used to ensure that Brazilians of African descent were denied many of the 
rights afforded to Brazilians of European stock.  As such, Brazil’s legal system and its 
police have discriminated against the poorest segments of the population, especially 
blacks. (Fausto 1984)  As Reiter also wrote, “on the societal level, Bahian civil society 
has proven neither sufficiently strong nor autonomous enough to pressure the state to act 
on behalf of the historically excluded.” (Reiter, 2008; 349) 
 
The Rationalizing State and Capitalism 
In addition to patrimonialism, other factors have had a decidedly negative influence on 
violence in Brazil.  Among the institutions that have been discussed, any and all of the 
have the potential to undermine Brazil’s democratic development.  The rationalizing state 
should be looked at as another reason for the persistence of violence in Brazil.  As he 
remarked in an essay, “during the second half of the twentieth century, the Brazilian state 
grounded its legitimacy basically on its ability to generate economic growth, while it 
neglected social dimensions, especially education, housing and health care.” (Sorj, 2005; 
7)  This neglect caused a lack of investment in traditional poverty reduction measures and 
crime prevention programs.  It also ensures that the elite would continue to support the 
successive military governments. 
 Another key area that is important to this thesis is the ways that capitalism and 
social stratification interact in the Brazilian economic model, which is basically capitalist 
in nature.  As Sorj stated, “it is impossible to understand social stratification in Brazil 
without relating it to the wait it interacts with and builds upon its relation to social 
policies and patrimonialism.” (Sorj, 2005; 10) Like other capitalist countries, the social 
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structure in Brazil is molded by and based on a set of institutions that were created by 
historical forces and for a myriad of reasons.  It is clear that patrimonialism, the level of 
social inequality, the rationalizing state, the specific forms of sociability, and of 
citizenship can’t be deduced from the capitalist character of Brazilian society, although 
all these institutions may have been influenced by and refashioned through their roles in 
the process of capital accumulation. (Roett, 2010)  
 When looking at the prevalence of violence in Brazil and its myriad of causes, it 
is also helpful to look at how these problems intersect with the free market arrangements 
present in the country both presently and historically.  In explaining the causes of 
violence, one could take the traditional liberal position that the inefficiency of the state 
and its inability to deal with the situation is simply because there has been an inadequate 
application of market rules related to excessive state intervention in the economic sphere.  
This would also explain the continued existence of patrimonialism in modern day Brazil, 
as it is simply effective in doing what the state has historically been unable or unwilling 
to do efficiently.  From a left leaning paradigm, this same situation can be viewed 
through a slightly different prism in that patrimonalism as merely exploitation of the 
working classes by bourgeoisie.  Either way, capitalism has left an indelible mark on 
Brazilian society and as the economy has grown, so has the income gap between rich and 
poor. Brazil is the most outstanding since 10 percent of the richest absorb 50.6 percent of 
all income compared to the 0.8 percent going to the poorest ten percent. (MercoPress, 
2010) 
 
 
 46  
Social and Economic Inequality 
In continuing to look at the institutions that compose Brazilian society, there are other 
factors that are just as important as patrimonialism in explaining why Brazil is a violent 
society. It also helps to explain why social inequalities continue to exist and are difficult 
to completely erase from the modern reality of Brazil.  As Sorj wrote in his paper called 
The Seven Faces of Brazilian Society, “it is impossible to understand social stratification 
in Brazil without relating it to the way it interacts with and builds its relation to social 
policies and patrimonialism.” (Sorj, 2005; 22) 
 Economic inequality in Brazil is easily but not exclusively manifest in 
consumerism.  The simple fact remains that a vast majority of the country’s poor cannot 
afford to buy consumer goods beyond very basic products.  Certainly, goods such as 
electronics, cars, and jewelry are completely out of reach for a vast majority of the 
population.  In measuring differential access to consumer goods, it is quite easy to see 
there is a wide division in Brazil.  What is more problematic, according to Sorj, is 
measuring the differential access to collective goods and services offered by and 
normally guaranteed by the state.  This would include garbage pickup, electricity, 
running potable water, telephone, sewerage, education, and healthcare.   Because more 
than one-third of Brazil’s population has not completed primary school, there is a huge 
gap in economic terms between those that are illiterate and those than can read. (Sorj, 
2005)  In essence, even if these guaranteed state services were available, many poor and 
illiterate people would not know where to apply for these services.  Thus, a lack of 
education and social services continues the cycles of poverty.  In addition, many 
government agencies and utility providers won’t enter the shantytowns as they are 
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viewed as illegitimate so services are even further out of reach for favela residents.  
According to Francesca Frayssinet, once again, “what is singularly Brazilian is the 
importance of these social gaps, including basic infrastructure, violence in poorer 
neighborhoods, and educational inequality.” (Frayssinet, 2009; 3)  These problems are 
still prevalent and have worsened due to the social policies promulgated by the many 
successive military governments in power from the 1960’s to the early 1980’s.  During 
those three decades, there was explosive growth in Brazil’s urban centers and a huge 
demographic shift to these areas.  This influx of people to the cities en mass made social 
inequities even more pronounced. Politically, the military regimes placed social issues at 
the bottom of their agenda. This legacy is evident today with Brazil’s poverty and crime 
rate improving little in the past thirty years.   
 Another important aspect of social stratification is that fact that its central tenet is 
based on unequal access to the aforementioned types of public goods we often take for 
granted.  In reality, a person’s residence defines access to public services such as running 
water, sewerage, education, and the proximity of health care and ambulance service.  In 
my thesis, however, the most important contribution that Sorj makes is his remark that 
“(a person’s place of residence) defines the kind and amount of police coverage and (un) 
protection from crime.” (Sorj, 2005; 13)  Clearly, if you live in a favela, you have less 
police presence and protection from crime.  On the other hand, in the middle class and 
upper class neighborhoods of Brazil, there is always an abundance of police officers that 
are often supplemented by gates and security barriers as well as an army of private 
security officers.  This contributes to many urban areas becoming walled off and cities 
becoming a series of enclaves, with residents living separate, parallel, and unequal lives 
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in the same country.  Teresa Caldeira wrote about this duality in her article Fortified 
Enclaves: The New Urban Segregation.  She wrote, “the proliferation of fortified 
enclaves has created a new model of spatial segregation and transformed the quality of 
public life…fortified enclaves are privatized, enclosed, and monitored spaces for 
residences, consumption, leisure, and work…they appeal to those who are abandoning 
the traditional public sphere.” (Caldeira, 1996; 303)  Brazil is, in many ways, multiple 
societies living side-by-side, interdependent yet often ignoring that shared fates of each 
other. Upon final analysis, the City of São Paulo is one of the world’s largest 
metropolitan areas with one of the most unequal distributions of wealth in the world.  As 
a consequence, “the character of public space and of citizens’ participation in public life 
changes.” (Caldeira, 1996; 303)   
 
The Mutability of Brazilian Institutions 
Another facet that is important to look at when analyzing the persistence of violence in 
Brazil is the non-cumulative logic of Brazilian institutions.  The Brazilian polity is 
dynamic in such a way that new institutions and organizations are created so frequently 
that they are often quickly obsolete and condemned to that fate almost as rapidly as they 
are created.  What this means is that “this perpetual movement is the discontinuity in the 
allocation of resources, blind spots voids in the chain of command, and the tendency of 
each new government to see himself as the founder of a new era.” (Sorj, 2005; 14)  
Depending on how one looks at this, it shows that Brazil always has a seeming 
willingness to try new things and new initiatives compared to more staid nations such as 
those in Europe or North America.  A more pessimistic view would be that Brazil’s 
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institutional system is so fragile that is rendered ineffective and is not able to deal with 
the problems of society.  In the prism of what this thesis is looking at, the mutability of 
Brazil’s institutions means that they are less than effective in fighting poverty, corruption, 
and thus violence in the society. 
 
Citizenship, Representation and Patterns of Sociability 
Besides the factors that I have already discussed, there are two more factors that seem 
relevant when trying to explain Brazil’s violence.  These are the concepts of citizenship 
and the concepts of political representativeness in Brazil.  Roberto Schwartz describes 
liberal institutions in Brazil as having misplaced ideals, where social practices contradict 
the principles formally embedded in the Brazilian legal system. (Schwartz, 1977)  What 
he meant was that Brazil is a representative democracy and that all of its citizens can 
theoretically run for and be in public office. In actuality, mainly the elite hold office as 
they are the only ones that have the money and political prowess to mount an effective 
campaign, which demonstrates the concept of patrimonialism is alive and well in Brazil. 
 As I have indicated previously, the Brazilian state’s inability to control violence 
has undermined citizenship in reality while theoretically Brazil is democratic.  These 
factors all come together and produce an undermining of the Brazilian public sphere, as 
they erode the opportunities for Brazilians to come together.  This has the effect of 
undermining the very nature of democracy in Brazil.  In a poll conducted in 2008 by 
Senses, a Brazilian polling organization; showed an almost unanimous amount of 
Brazilians (86 percent) felt that one of the country’s greatest problems is the absence of 
social justice and the impunity enjoyed by its most powerful members. (Pesquisa 
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Nacional, 2003) In the end, Brazilian democracy and citizenship is under pressure and the 
violent nature of conflict within Brazilian society will continue until certain conditions of 
social equality are met, especially in terms of access to collective goods like education, 
jobs, and social security.  There are proven prerequisites to active participation in a 
modern developed democracy. 
 
Violent Sites: The Rural and the Urban 
When looking at the many published statistics on crime and related criminal activities, it 
is clear that despite the country’s characteristic playfulness and fun loving reputation, 
Brazil is a very dangerous place.  In Brazil, violence is prevalent everywhere, not just in 
urban slums.  The fact is that violence is of a different character in rural areas than in the 
urban areas but it exists nevertheless. Of course the violence seen in Brazil is multi-
dimensional and stems from a myriad of social problems.  It’s main source, “is the 
government’s longstanding abandonment or minimal presence in regions where the poor 
and socially excluded are concentrated.” (Cukier et. al., 2005; 242) This is most often 
prevalent in the rural areas of the Northeast where a majority of the population is not of 
European decent.  This violence, furthermore, is disproportionately felt by those living in 
the mountainside favelas of large cities where they are ruled over by gangs of drug-
dealers, who are at war and sometimes in collusion with the police.  It is also in Brazil’s 
poorer rural regions that large landowners still control large private armies that act with 
near total impunity and act as their own law enforcement.   
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Violence: The State and Police 
Violence is also rooted in the police themselves and the institution they serve in.  Both 
the civil and military police are shown to be corrupt and still have not distanced 
themselves from the use of torture and the assassination of presumed delinquents and 
criminals, mostly from the lower classes.  As I had mentioned in the previous section on 
the rationalizing state, this is another example of the state’s inability to eradicate violence 
due to its very structural ineptness.  Additionally, the failings of the police forces are 
widely known and frequently analyzed and discussed in the sensationalist Brazilian ones.  
In many cases, the residents of poorer areas have taken their security into their own hands 
or trust the drug gangs more than the police for their protection.  An example comes from 
a favela near Rio called Jacarezinho, which is one of the most violent of all the 
shantytowns.  One of its residents said, “I can sleep with my doors open because no one 
comes in to steal…the local drug gangs stand guard over the area, preventing robbery, 
rape and other crimes within the community.  The problem is not the drug traffickers, but 
the police when they come into the favela.” (Frayssinet, 2009; 8) 
 Furthermore, violence can be seen inside jails and detention centers throughout 
the country where large numbers of prisoners are corralled in substandard conditions that 
are filthy and breeding grounds for rebellion.  Under these conditions, the prisoners suffer 
both moral and physical degradation, humiliation, and abuse.  The middle and upper 
classes are not immune from violence.  In fact, violence permeates all social classes 
whereby the middle and upper classes are subject to kidnappings, extortion, armed 
robberies, and muggings.   
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An alarming issue when analyzing the impact of violence on Brazil is the state’s 
abandonment of certain public spaces.  This social phenomenon is rampant as there are 
many urban areas where armed gangs of drug dealers work in collusion with members of 
the police force and the state has informally ceded all control of public areas within these 
areas to these illegal groups.  This had lead to a situation where quasi-states are created 
and the legitimate state has no control.  As such, this situation produces a psychosis of 
fear that triggers support for repressive policies and a complete disregard for civil rights.  
In addition, as I have previously mentioned, it allows for the police to operate with 
almost total impunity.  According to statistics from the security forces themselves, “the 
Rio police force is one of the world’s most violent, with around 1,000 people a year 
killed in incidents classified as shootouts with police” (Frayssinet, 2009; 10). 
  
Conclusion  
In looking at how patrimonialism has fomented violence in modern Brazilian society, it is 
easy to see that the processes at work are both complicated and multifaceted.  In play is a 
legacy of patrimonalist practices, political corruption, and impunity of the elites that have 
contributed to the erosion of public trust in the Brazilian state and its institutions.   This 
makes the task of reforming what was once a predominantly patrimonial society into one 
that is more individualistic and democratic a primary goal of the democratization process 
in Brazil.  Social relations that were predominantly based on traditional hierarchies have 
been transformed.  Now, political processes and production are urban in nature with the 
power of the rural elites vastly diminished.  This process began decades ago as the 
military regime’s main legitimacy was by delivering economic growth and stability as 
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opposed to political freedoms and social equality.  The military did this while failing to 
tackle corruption or increasing the public’s confidence in the state to combat violence and 
crime among other social ills.  From the early 1980’s until the mid 1990’s, Brazil was 
plagued by inflation and an inept state unable to deliver services to its citizens in an 
efficient matter.  Persistent corruption scandals and distrust of the state and its politicians 
ensured that public did not believe the state could effectively control violence or provide 
a security apparatus that was impartial or even able to carry out its mission.  With the 
stabilization of the Brazilian state and continuity of civilian rule, there is a real chance 
that Brazil’s violent legacy can be changed for the future. 
 In the end, all the factors I have discussed end up undermining the Brazilian 
public sphere, as they erode the opportunities for Brazilians to come together.  This has 
the effect of undermining the very nature of democracy in Brazil.  As I have stated, my 
central argument is that for democracy to flourish, people from all economic and social 
classes must come together to form a more just and equal society that provides 
opportunity for all.  In the end, democracy is severely restricted and endangered if those 
people trying to advance society are afraid to meet in the public spaces that should safe 
and secure for all members of the polity. 
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CHAPTER 4: THE PRECARIOUS NATURE OF DOMESTIC SECURITY  	  
In 1998, the United Nations General Assembly ratified a mission statement that said, 
“transforming cultures of violence into cultures of peace has long been one of the main 
goals of the United Nations.” (United Nations, 2004) This resolution resonates with the 
declared goals of many civil rights organizations within Brazil, both governmental and 
nongovernmental, that are interested in building a stronger culture of peace within Brazil 
and reducing the level of violence in the society.  However, it is truly staggering to look 
at the impact of race and class on police violence, as it continues to hinder the 
achievement of these goals.  Popular support action against criminal elements and the 
public’s indifference to police violence constitutes a major obstacle to building a stronger 
culture of peace in Brazil.  Furthermore, attitudes about civil rights in Brazil are 
formulated not formulated only through international debate, but also through the daily 
experiences of a nation’s people. There is a paradox in Brazil in that the Brazilian polity 
supports police violence but as that as the violence spreads, those who support it may be 
more victimized by it.   
 In this chapter, I identify the relationships between every day experiences that are 
molded by a person’s class, gender, and race and then I explain how these experiences 
impact a person’s outlook and attitude towards violence.  To do this, I have conducted a 
literature review and subsequent analysis of what experts believe are the impacts of race, 
gender, and class, on how those factors impact a person’s views on civil rights and the 
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appropriateness of extralegal violence. 
 I have examined, among other things, the research conducted in Brazil by The 
University of São Paulo Violence Studies Program FAPESP-Fundação de Amparo à 
Pesquisa do Estado de São Paulo. What this research shows is that race and class do 
affect a person’s view on extralegal violence and their support of the punishment 
associated with it.  I also assert that Afro-Brazilians are less supportive of extralegal 
violence while whites and those of the middle and upper classes will more likely support 
a stronger police presence and tolerate more extralegal violence.  The social and cultural 
context of police violence in Brazil is the starting point from which to understand the 
public’s support of such violence.  In order to establish a context, it is necessary to look 
at the historical, cultural, and ideological environment in which people make sense of 
their life experiences.   In the case of modern Brazil, I will at the role of race, gender, and 
social class in a person’s support of police brutality and extrajudicial violence.  Does race 
and class matter in regard to supporting extralegal police violence?  The other poignant 
question is why many Brazilians are reluctant to define torture and extrajudicial killings 
as a violation of civil rights. (Bittar, 2008)  In this study, I begin by analyzing and 
understanding the historical context under which Brazilians experience their everyday 
lives..  These inherent social and cultural beliefs about race and class are critical 
components to understanding support for such extralegal police violence.  
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Historical Perspectives on Violence 
Throughout recent history, the police forces in Brazil have often been employed to 
suppress the lower classes for the benefit of the wealthier middle and upper classes. 
(Holloway, 1993; 17)  The historian Thomas Holloway posited that no Brazilian, from 
any social class, would concur that the historical role of the police force has been either 
legitimate or by given by consent.  The majority of Brazilians have seen the police forces 
as “necessary agents of order and discipline,” (Holloway, 1993; 4) while mostly 
academic critics have seen the police as being the representation of the “authoritarian 
state in repressive action.” (Holloway, 1993; 5)   Regardless of their perception, both the 
military and civilian police have played an important role in Brazilian politics.   
 If Brazilian history is used as a guide, it is important to remember that the country 
was under a military dictatorship for more than twenty years from the mid sixties until a 
return to civilian governance in 1984.  It was commonplace for the military dictatorship 
to control its population by coercive means using the police while limiting civil liberties.  
As such, strict censorship rules were enforced and liberal ideas were limited.  This 
produced a situation where many prominent students, journalists, artists, and professors 
simply disappeared or were expelled from Brazil.  At this time, when nearly any action 
was seen as betrayal or espionage against the dictatorship, the military used various 
methods of torture to quell dissident groups.  The widespread use of torture, however, 
was effectively shielded from the general public and its use did not become widely 
known until the military ceded power to a civilian administration in 1985. (Holloway, 
1993)  
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In the early 1970’s, Amnesty International published a report that detailed allegations 
against the military and its use of torture in Brazil.  Prior to this report, the organization 
had received many complaints from former prisoners and victims of torture.  When 
Amnesty International tried to investigate these claims, however, they were repelled at 
every juncture and received no cooperation from the Brazilian military.  They did, 
however, manage to document many accounts of the torture by its victims.  As such, 
these depositions led Amnesty International to conclude that the torture had been 
implemented by a “multiplicity of security services with torture that had been well 
studied and developed.” (Holloway, 1993; 46)  
 If history is evaluated, then it becomes clear that the Roman Catholic Church also 
played a very significant, if not the most significant, role in documenting and chronicling 
the use of torture by the Brazilian military during the so called “lost years” of the military 
dictatorship.  The Archdiocese of São Paulo, as an example, secretly recorded the uses of 
torture and later published a book called Brasil: Nunca Mais in 1985.  Within the first 
month of publication, the book was the number one selling book in Brazil and remained 
on the bestseller list for 91 weeks.  In 1998, it was named one of Brazil’s “all-time best 
selling nonfiction works.” (Dassin et. al., 1998)  Although the military returned power to 
a civilian administration some twenty-five years ago, there are still lasting psychological 
scars endured by many Brazilians.  The military is still seen in a negative light for some 
and people are still morally repulsed by the events that took place nearly a quarter 
century ago. (Rohter, 2004)  
 It is quite puzzling and complicated to reconcile the attitudes of the Brazilian 
public when it comes to support for extralegal police violence.  An astute example is that 
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the public is deeply scarred and sensitive to the legacy of the military’s violence against 
the Brazilian citizenry during the dictatorship.  This outrage over the systematic torture of 
Brazilian citizens by their own army some 25 years ago is juxtaposed, however, against 
the modern reality that many people in Brazil are indifferent towards similar violence 
directed against criminals by the civil and military police forces.  Teresa Caldeira (2000) 
goes through great lengths in her book City of Walls, to analyze the sources and logic of 
popular support for a violent and corruptible police force that coexists with a high 
victimization of working-class people. She argues that the roots of this paradox are found 
in the Brazilian state’s long history of disrespect for civil rights, in particular poor 
people's rights and a deep disbelief in the fairness of the justice system and its ability to 
function without bias. (Caldeira, 2001)  As Avritzer wrote, “Brazilians succeeded in 
institutionalizing democratic politics, they also experience the delegitimation of many 
institutions of law, resulting in a privatization of justice, escalation of both violent crime 
and police abuse, criminalization of the poor...and support for illegal and/or authoritarian 
measures of control. (Avritzer, 2002; 265) The vitality of Brazil’s electoral democracy 
has not been accompanied by any improvement in the large criminal justice system.  In 
spite of the governmental attempts to adhere to the rules and norms of international and 
national law, the majority of the elite population seems to prefer what she describes as a 
translucent police force that is not very effective but serves the purpose of the elites. As 
Caldeira wrote, “the more brutal the police, the better, as expressed in the morbid popular 
cliché, ‘a good criminal is a dead criminal.’ (Caldeira, 2001; 168) 
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History, Race, and the Prevalence of Violence 
Brazil, in the opinion of scholars R.W. Shirley (1987) and Richard Dellafave (2008) is a 
society built on complex class and racial stratifications.  For some, Brazil is seen as being 
authoritarian in nature where economic and political power has been concentrated 
historically in the hands of a small and landed elite.  From its colonial days, these elites 
sought control of the slave class, which later morphed into a peasant class. (Shirley, 
1987) Dellafave, attempted to explain Brazil’s social stratification by looking at its 
origins and institutionalization by those that have wealth and power along with those that 
have nothing at all.  He referred to this process of legitimization as an almost normative 
approval of stratification. (Dellafave, 2008)  Dellafave also explains his self-evaluation 
theory which explains how legitimization “…is reproduced by describing the process 
through which existing unequal distributions of power in the society at large translate into 
congruent norms of distribution which becomes an integral part of the self-identities of 
the members of a society.” (Dellafave, 2008; 478)  Accordingly, in his congruence/equity 
theory, those people who are resource rich believe that they have these resources as a 
result of their own actions and hard work.  On the other hand, those people with fewer 
resources believe their share is equitable even if they desire to have more.  An interesting 
question that Dellafave proposes is whether or not people would invest in their own 
subordination.  He posits that, “the day to day life of people includes learning how to 
function socially and thus be able to fit in.” (Dellafave, 2008; 263)  What he is trying to 
expose is that the quotidian knowledge about the appropriateness of a particular behavior 
includes the very norms of subordination and dominance experienced in a daily setting.  
Normally, these actions go on unquestioned, but any deviation from or an attempt to 
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change them is seen most often as either abnormal or completely separated from reality.  
Simply put, Dellafave is saying that a person’s daily reality reinforces norms of equality 
and thus can produce a legitimization of inequality.   
 The conclusion that I have come to is that the legitimization of violence by the 
police and other state organs in Brazil are similar to and potentially the direct product of a 
legitimization of inequality.  This is manifest in the daily lives of Brazilians and their 
personal experiences.  This reality then includes norms of subordination and super-
ordination, which often enforces the view that the poor and darker classes are less 
deserving of equal rights or treatment.  Contrastingly, people from the upper and whiter 
classes seem to take a paternalistic view towards the poor, which allows them to be 
physically and psychologically detached from them.  As Caldeira wrote, “the 
psychological distancing is achieved by creating symbolic fences in the form of 
stereotypes and prejudices of the poor, as well as literally constructing material fences to 
create physical separation.” (Caldeira, 2001; 152)  Furthermore, Caldeira goes on to 
make the argument that although the upper class believes there is little the poor can do to 
improve their condition, they concurrently blame the poor for both their inability to rise 
out of poverty and contribute more completely to the society as a whole. (Caldeira, 2001)   
 Statistically, the victims of police violence tend to be residents of poor and mostly 
black and racially mixed neighborhoods. (SEJUP, 2007) Due to the social distancing and 
“walling” that are common in Brazil both now and in the past, there is little spatial 
interaction publically. As a further result of this separation and the socially constructed 
“walls” of Brazilian society, the upper class has very little empathy and thus only 
minimal interaction with the lower classes.  It would thus be common sense to surmise 
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that lower class and Afro-Brazilians would be less supportive of the police and view them 
with disdain and suspicion.  This is, indeed, the case as they are more likely to have been 
victims of direct police violence themselves. (Silva, 1998)  It is evident that these same 
victims of police brutality often use prejudices and stereotyping against their own fellow 
neighbors that are similarly mired in poverty and exclusion.  It is an irony that these are 
the very same arguments used by the upper classes against the poor.  As Caldeira 
emphasized, the poor and mostly black, “emphasize their own dignity, cleanliness, good 
citizenship, home ownership, and good family to create distinctions between themselves 
and other poor.” (Caldeira, 2001; 80)   
 It is almost unconscionable to believe, but the fact remains, that in less than a 
decade, from 1997-2007, the São Paulo Civil and Military Police killed almost 5500 
people in that state. (Silva, 1998)  Due to often unreliable and ambiguous data, it is 
difficult and often impossible to understand how these people met their final minutes.  In 
the past few years however, many anecdotal stories and short narratives that describe the 
situations leading up to these deaths have been made available through non-governmental 
organizations and watchdog groups. (Alves et. al., 2010)  As such, given the complexity 
of the task and absence of reliable information, it is difficult to extrapolate information 
and form conclusions from this data.  In the end, surely, it is easy to see that João Costa 
Vargas is correct when stating that, “state-sanctioned lethal violence feeds from, at the 
same time as it energizes, social environments marked by frequent death.” (Alves et. al., 
2010; 612) When looking at Brazilian history as a whole, it is easy to see that it has a 
certain vulnerability to violence and death.  In fact, Brazil has had a history of deep and 
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lasting social inequalities often disproportionately affecting those with darker skin.  In 
Brazil, death is not equally distributed along the class, gender, and racial divide.   
 According to Costa Vargas, “State violence in Brazil is an index of the 
precariousness of substantive citizenship, and the ways in which citizenship- or, rather, 
the lack of it- is inflected by and is reflected in the spatialization of race, gender, and 
class.” (Alves et. al., 2010; 613) It is obvious that disparities in employment, income, 
education, infant mortality, and vulnerability to violent death are deeply influenced by the 
unequal distribution of wealth and opportunity along racial, socioeconomic, and gender 
lines in the modern nation of Brazil.  As James Holston and Teresa Caldeira wrote, “the 
civil component of citizenship remains impaired as citizens suffer systematic violations 
of their rights.  In such uncivil democracies, violence, injustice, and impunity are the 
norms.” (Agüero & Stark, 1998; 263) 
 An example of this system of inequalities is well documented by R.W. Silva who 
wrote, “Afro-Brazilians experience state-sanctioned violence, not only by the peculiar 
institution of the police, but also by the social and institutional mechanisms embodied in 
schools and hospitals…that perpetuate the relative disadvantages for blacks while 
reproducing white privilege.” (Silva, 1998; 274)  From an historical perspective, Afro-
Brazilians have always experienced discrimination and exclusion. By further analyzing 
Brazilian life from a sociological vantage point, Brazilian social realities certainly have 
racist practices embedded within them, although it doesn’t include that much 
institutional, organized, or ideological racism as is seen so often in countries like the 
United States.  As is often evident, certain social inequalities in Brazil are associated with 
racist practices.  As Ciconello pointed out, “The unacceptable gaps that still separate 
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black, white, and mixed Brazilians in the 21st century can be felt in the microcosm of 
day-to-day interpersonal relations and are reflected in unequal access to goods and 
services, to the labor market, to higher education, and to civil, social, and economic 
rights." (Ciconello, 1998; 4)  There are also other factors that adequately explain the 
racial inequalities that still prevail in Brazil, such as a past history of exclusion and the 
invisibility of the black population, its poverty, and particularly a scenario of denial of 
their rights after slavery was abolished in Brazil in 1888. (Ciconello, 1998) 
In my research on Brazil, I have come to the conclusion that while social life displays 
racist components, there is no systematic ideology of stigmatization, nor has there been 
any political party or relevant organization in civil society that directly or indirectly 
assumed racism as an explicit ideology during the past century in Brazil.  There is, 
however, a clear case of social distancing in Brazil where both the rich and poor live in 
completely separate parallel universes.  They have little interaction with the poor and 
darker elements of society so it is quite easy to personify the evil and bad people as being 
black, poor, and worthy or being brutalized under the guise of public control by the 
police.   
 
The Myth of a Racial Democracy 
In studying Brazil, the African roots are a large of component of Brazilian culture has 
been openly affirmed in a wide variety of artistic manifestations, particularly during the 
second half of the 20th century. These include all forms of music, dance, and other types 
of art.  Although Brazilian blacks have been mistreated in many respects, especially in 
regards to economic opportunity, they do not seem to feel that Brazilian culture has 
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expelled or excluded them, thereby compelling them to seek to return to their original 
homes back in Africa.  This is in contrast to the Liberian experiment of American Slaves 
in the 19th century or the “back to Africa” movements espoused by Malcolm X and his 
followers in the United States during the 1950’s and 1960’s.  Moreover, dominant 
Brazilian ideology characteristically devalues the past and tends to look towards the 
future, and this deprives the black movement of a reference point from which it can begin 
to understand and internally process the period of slavery according to many 
Brazilianists. (Skidmore, 1992) 
 In many ways, Brazilian political and artistic culture often focuses on the future.  
This can be seen in many forms of Brazilian architecture like the edifices found in 
Brasilia to popular Brazilian literature and films like those from the Cinema Novo 
movement dating from the 1960’s.  Beyond this, even popular music in Brazil- musica 
popular brasilera MPB- reflects an almost total obsession with optimism along with a 
focus on the future.  One of Brazil’s omnipresent myths, and one that the twentieth-
century acceleration of economic growth brought into focus, is the idea that the country 
had a promising future despite its past history. The latter is indeed to be considered as a 
weight, owing to a negative view of the Portuguese colonizers, of the transplanted blacks, 
and even the native peoples, which are thought of as the three original “races” making up 
Brazil. According to this vision, the weight of the past will be overcome by “whitening” 
the population, by miscegenation, and by realizing the country’s potential, expressed 
above all in its size and natural wealth. (Carvalho, 1999) Focusing on the future means 
having an especially open attitude towards foreigners. While other cultures may see 
foreigners as a source of contamination and even a bastardization of the national roots, 
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the opposite is supported in Brazil. The orientation of Brazilians towards the future 
means that they have a certain disdain for the past and fail to nurture this in their national 
memory. This focus on the future, combined with the non-existence of egalitarian values 
transmitted through the educational system, has engendered another characteristic of 
Brazilian culture: it has a low level of animosity toward wealth according to Bernard 
Sorj. (Sorj, 2005)  This is precisely why there tends to be so much extralegal violence 
supported by the elites and this makes effective oversight of these competing 
organizations nearly impossible.   In many instances as I have stated before, the police 
can operate with near complete impunity.   Furthermore, what little oversight exists is 
divided as the civil and military police are separate.  Along with this, there is apparently 
little resentment or envy towards ostentation, which in more egalitarian societies might 
breed opposition and rebellion.  This lack of resentment towards the wealth, means that 
the both the poor and wealthy live in two separate worlds that don’t intermingle with 
each other.  In the case of policing, the wealthy and middle classes ignore the poorer 
classes along with the violence that is inflicted upon them by the police.  This ignorance 
is a further example of the walled society that is seen in Brazil today and thus continues 
the promulgation of violence.  There is no true racial democracy, it is just a myth and this 
proves it had been demobilized by the events of recent times.   
 
The Complexities of Race and Violence 
The notion of race in Brazil is both complex and in many cases contradictory.  It is 
necessary to look at the historical development of racial ideology in Brazil both before 
and after the abolition of slavery in 1888.  There was rampant miscegenation and unlike 
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the dichotomous system of racial classification in the United States, mixed blood 
mulattos were recognized as a distinct and separate racial category in Brazil. (Skidmore, 
1974)  This is only one facet of a classification system that was much more fluid but 
complex in Brazil in comparison with the United States.  The mulattos were allowed 
limited upward mobility based on their cultural and physical whiteness.  That is, the fairer 
skinned and more educated a person was, the more likely that person could move up the 
social ladder and be considered whiter. As the 19th century ended and the 20th began, 
many elites in Brazil were looking to solve their so-called problem of “negritude.”  As 
Nancy Leys Stepan pointed out, “Brazilian doubts about the country’s racial identity, had 
long been reinforced by racist interpretations of Brazil from abroad. (Stepan, 1991; 44) 
These elites were willing to accept the prevailing Darwinist racial ideologies of Europe 
and the United States were white was considered superior.  The Brazilian reality was, 
however, quite different and the population much blacker than the elites wanted to admit 
or even think.  At the same time, there was an increasingly large group of upwardly 
mobile mulattos.  This tension that existed was eventually solved and synthesized into a 
Brazilian theory of whitening that assumed “miscegenation did not inevitably produce 
degenerates but could forge a healthy mixed population growing steadily whiter, both 
culturally and physically.” (Skidmore, 1974; 65) Historically in Brazil, there has never 
been a strong tendency to separate people based on race as there was in the United States 
and Europe.  In fact, efforts to raise racial distinctions through peculiar racial or black 
movements have been traditionally seen as unproductive, racist, and above all, anti- 
Brazilian. 
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Throughout most of its history, a common notion held by a majority of Brazilians is that 
the country is, truly and purely, a racial democracy.  While this is inaccurate, there is 
clear evidence that racial stratification based purely on color is less of an issue in Brazil 
than other countries.  In fact, according to Michael Hanchard, a great majority of 
Brazilians have a hard time distinguishing between racial discrimination and other forms 
of oppression. (Hanchard, 1994)  To be fair, the patterns of discrimination when applied 
to social relationships are often severe and have had a tremendous impact on the country.  
In the 1960’s, the all-encompassing UNESCO study of Brazil showed definitively that 
the darker a person’s skin, the more likely they are to be in the lowest bracket of income, 
education, and occupational prestige. (Skidmore, 1974; 119) Hanchard also conducted a 
more contemporary analysis in 1994 and wrote that, “(the) social implications of being 
black in Brazil continue to include having a lower standard of living and less access to 
healthcare and education.” (Hanchard, 1994; 65)  To emphasize this state of affairs, 
blacks are also more likely to be victims of torture and extrajudicial violence according to 
the 1997 SEJUP survey of violence among citizens in the State of São Paulo from 1997 
to 2007. (Hanchard, 1994)  Despite the overwhelming statistical evidence that race does 
matter in Brazil, many citizens believe that race is really a subset of class-based barriers.  
While I do not support this simplistic view, it is correctly assumed that class and race are 
inextricably linked.  In his study of elite violence and social control, R.S. Rose stated, 
“disparities in income and job attainment between blacks and whites act: the more 
education that black job seekers obtain, the farther they fall behind their white peers in 
the competition for good jobs and salaries, and the greater an impediment discrimination 
seems to become.” (Hanchard, 1994; 76)  The evidence shows that race can have 
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negative effects, independent of class effects.  In Brazil, the myth that prevails is the view 
that it is a racial democracy. That view also has serious consequences for discrimination 
and incidences of extrajudicial violence.  With a lack of motivation to reduce racial 
stereotyping, Brazilians are often guided by a prejudiced set of beliefs that seek to 
exclude certain groups of people from access to basic civil rights.  For the purposes of 
this research, two groups that I will evaluate more closely are criminals and prisoners 
being held in the state penal system in Brazil. 
 
Extralegal and Racial Misunderstanding 
When looking at extralegal violence committed against the Brazilian population by the 
police force, one statistic is strikingly clear and that is that race matters.  According to the 
1997 study conducted by SEJUP, the predominant group of people tortured or killed by 
the police is Afro-Brazilian men living in lower class neighborhoods. (SEJUP, 1997)  
The police ombudsman for the city of São Paulo, Benedito Domingos Mariano said, 
“(that) during the time of the dictatorship the middle class opposed torture because their 
children were the victims.  Today nobody pays attention to it because it takes place on the 
poorer peripheries of the cities…areas these people of the elite classes do not know.” 
(SEJUP, 1997)  As with all studies, the paradigm from which to view and understand 
extralegal violence among citizens must include the variables of race and class.  When 
looking at Brazil, there is certainly no exception and from my research it is clear that race 
and class are not only important, but are perhaps the most important factors when 
analyzing violence.  Cultural biases about race and class undoubtedly effect ideas about 
the civil rights of the poor and marginalized Afro-Brazilian criminals as an example.  As 
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Teresa Caldeira writes, “the way the people talk about crime and criminals is frequently 
marked by prejudices and stereotypes.” (Caldeira, 2001; 35) It is fair to say that many 
middle and upper class Brazilians are less aware of the extent to which torture and 
extrajudicial killings by the police occur as they insulate themselves from these people 
through security mechanisms as Caldeira called the idea in her book City of Walls. 
(Caldeira, 2001) Even when the middle and upper classes are made aware of instances of 
police violence, the often conjure up stereotypical visions of poor and black criminals.  
This is a way they can justify that the violence inflicted on these people is just and 
deserved.  Concurrently, many people from the lower classes also justify police violence 
in a similar way.  The create a sense of social distancing by making a clear distinction 
between themselves as law abiding citizens and the criminals as undeserving and violent 
law breakers regardless of them being of the same race of not.  The salient group 
identities become the law-breakers against the law-abiders instead of the development of 
a shared racial or class based commonality. (Caldeira, 2001) However, due to Brazil’s 
history of slavery, importing more Africans as slaves than any other country in the 
Western Hemisphere, and its staggering level of poverty- in 2010, 26 percent of the 
Brazilian population lived below the poverty line and 87 percent of those below the 
poverty line were of non-white racial origins. (IndexMundi, 2010)  As is evident from 
these figures, race and class are very strong indicators for those that are routinely victims 
of crime in Brazil.  In looking at these figures, it is important that I define poverty, in this 
case, as a form of violence against people.  By not stopping poverty, the Brazilian state is 
keeping a large part of its human capital under the poverty line, and this is clearly a form 
of state violence against its people. 
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Civil Rights Paradigms and the Brazilian Reality 
Now it is appropriate to expand on the theories and concepts prevailing in modern Brazil 
when it comes to civil rights.  Historically, many scholars have argued that civil rights 
exist in order to protect the dignity of a citizen within his or her society In the western 
liberal conception of civil rights, there has historically been a strong commitment towards 
protecting and promoting human dignity while providing a protective mechanism against 
violence. 
 Ironically, however, It is not hard to find the civil rights of people being violated 
in the world today.  In a myriad of locations globally, these violations occur between and 
among individuals, governments, and other entities.  Brazil, according to Teresa Caldeira, 
is unique in the fact that there is a tacit but widespread opposition to the legitimacy of the 
civil rights regime against criminals (Caldeira, 2001) In his 1998 editing of an academic 
study of civil rights, Tony Evans (1998) argued that the powerful elites within a society 
socially construct civil rights norms in a self-serving and exclusive manner. (Evans, 
1998)  This process can certainly be seen in present day Brazil when applied to the rights 
of prisoners but it has not always been the case.  During the many years of military rule, 
upper and middle class Brazilians were prisoners of those regimes and consequently 
demanded respect of civil rights and the release of political prisoners.  More often than 
not, these upper and middle class individuals were precisely the groups that were calling 
for civil rights in the face of repression and imprisonment by the military rulers.  
Ironically, as the military governments faded into history these same upper and middle 
class individuals are blocking the very progress of civil rights for prisoners in Brazil.  
According to Caldeira, opposition to civil rights by these elites in Brazil became evident 
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when these civil rights campaigners tried to extend civil rights to the general prison 
population through legal changes (Caldeira, 2001) 
 It is clear that in this case, Brazilians feel that certain factors determine equality 
and that some people are more or less equal than others.  In Brazil, race and class based 
issues are clearly important when looking at any civil rights paradigm.  Inherent in any 
civil rights paradigm, there is always the need to recognize that people are 
interconnected.  Since this is assumed to be the case, then breaking the social contract 
would elicit a harsh response and punishment from the organic group.  An example 
would be the response of a society to crime and the criminals that perpetrate the crimes.  
Exclusion of these groups from access to civil rights would further be legitimated by the 
traditional perspective of civil rights as these actors have broke the social contract by 
committing crimes against the society as a whole.  In addition these criminals are poorer 
and blacker than the society as a whole, which leads to a quandary of legitimacy. 
 If one is to look at the paradigm of civil rights from a traditional viewpoint, it is 
quite clear that civil rights laws deal with, among other issues, the rights of criminals.  
Many groups view this concept as absurd when applied to criminal elements in society, 
but this paradigm states that criminals are due their civil rights.  Teresa Caldeira (2001) 
traces the Brazilian public’s opposition to the extension of civil rights to criminals from 
1983.  For the City of São Paulo, the origin of this opposition came from the period of 
1983-1987, when Franco Montero was the governor of São Paulo state. (Caldeira, 2001)  
It was during his reign as governor that Mr. Montero placed a great emphasis on civil 
rights by reducing police violence and improving prison conditions.  Ironically, as 
Caldeira also points out, it was during this same time that crime and violence spiraled out 
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of control and people became concerned about public safety as well as their own personal 
well being.  As such, many beliefs about the very legitimacy of civil rights were 
fomented.  There was also increasing criticism of using public money in order to improve 
the rights of criminal, where that same limited pool of money could be used toward the 
social welfare of the working poor.  In an ironic sense, many believed at the time that by 
improving the civil rights of criminals, the government was not spending valuable money 
on policing and protecting the public.  In fact, Caldeira wrote that many people in Brazil 
believed that by protecting the rights of criminals you gave those same criminals the right 
to commit violent crimes. (Caldeira, 2001)  During the 1990’s, the strong resistance to 
extending civil rights to criminals was lessened somewhat, but the argument that 
criminals are somehow unworthy of being extended civil rights is still a common 
paradigm.  In fact even “Brazil’s business community was traditionally opposed to even 
police reform.  In this sense, it has benefited from, tolerated, and contributed to police 
corruption.” (Neto, 2006; 45) 
 According to Caldeira (2001), the language by which the Brazilian public speaks 
about crime and criminals is often rife with oversimplification and stereotypes.  
Criminals are often viewed in the light of being separated and disconnected from the 
public at large.  By viewing criminality in this vein, the discourse becomes more 
dehumanized and separated from the actual Brazilian reality. (Caldeira, 2001)  A major 
consequence of this separation is what can best be described as underdevelopment of 
penal proportionality.  This has led to a situation where, for example, the consequence of 
a mere petty crime such as theft can be perceived as severe as that for murder.  This is 
reinforced by the view, among the middle classes and elites, that all criminals are equally 
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undeserving of civil rights regardless of the crime.  As Teresa Caldeira stated, “…the talk 
of crime is at odds with the values if social equality, tolerance, and respect for others’ 
rights.  The talk of crime is productive, but it helps produce segregation (social and 
spatial), abused by the institutions of order, contestation of citizens’ rights, and, 
especially violence itself.” (Caldeira, 2001; 39) Thus by not distinguishing between a 
petty thief and a murderer, many middle and upper class Brazilians create and nurture an 
image about the “dangerous classes” – one that transforms all those poor and black into 
potential criminals and people to be feared.  Additionally, Reiter spoke of a duality in the 
court system for educated and non-educated defendants.  If the defendant is educated, 
they are put through one court and prison, which is less harsh in both conditions and 
treatment. This is not the case for those that are not college educated or come from the 
elite.  (Reiter, 2008)  This has the dual effect of the elites not caring or paying attention to 
laws and justice as they feel it does not apply to them, while the poor do not trust the 
system and put little faith in the belief that their outcome will be fair. 
 Broadly speaking, differing paradigms perfectly reflect the debate between the 
more egalitarian and more hierarchical ideals held by Brazilian society when it comes to 
civil rights.  Egalitarian ideals, although codified in the Brazilian constitution through 
laws that guide the government’s behavior towards criminals, seem to influence and 
guide public support and/or passive acquiescence to police violence towards suspected 
criminals.  When analyzing case studies and in actual practice, it quickly becomes 
obvious that this struggle between egalitarian and hierarchical ideals is rarely resolved.  
This is the case in both practice and in individuals as both these paradigms influence 
public attitudes about the civil rights of criminals.  I believe it is the case that individuals 
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act and express attitudes that are in line with both the traditional view of civil rights as 
well as a more expansive view.  Often times, this would appear too inconsistent, which it 
is, but it is rather consistent in explaining the schisms that exist within society in regards 
to the “ideal” outcome and the “real” outcome.  In an ideal world, Brazilians would like 
to live in a society where all people respect the law and would therefore be treated with 
dignity and respect.  Reality, however, is much more harsh and disorderly.  The fact is 
that people commit crimes and this causes an underlying conflict between the notions of 
treating that suspect with respect while questioning whether to treat them with same 
respect as the law-abiding citizen.    
 
The Response of the Brazilian State: A Plan For Action 
In Brazil, there is certainly a staggering problem with crime.  In fact, as Wlamir Campos 
wrote, “there is no doubt that the biggest social problem of this country (Brazil), in the 
last years, has been the huge increase in violence and the failure of the Federal 
Government in providing security to society.” (Campos, 2005; 18) There are many causes 
of these phenomena including a failure on the part of police to apprehend criminals and a 
judicial system that is simply too overloaded to efficiently punish those who have 
transgressed the law.  Due to these factors, crimes are committed with impunity all over 
Brazil.   Generally, Brazilians seem to have little faith that justice will prevail in their 
system. (Prillaman, 2000)  From a historical perspective, the formal legal structures in 
Brazil have been created and used for the benefit of the economic and political elite and 
justice for everyone else has been largely informal in nature. (Shirley, 1987)  As many 
academics have stated, vigilante justice or what some scholars have called “popular 
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justice” has long been viewed as a practical and appropriate alternative to the 
overburdened and inefficient legal system. (Prillaman, 2000)  According to R.W. Shirley, 
in a 1984 opinion poll, 48.2 percent of Brazilians who were surveyed supported vigilante 
justice. (Shirley, 1987)  Part of my research is looking at the potential parallels between 
support for citizen vigilante justice and support for extralegal violence by police as a 
manifestation of this type of vigilantism.  The reality in Brazil is that citizen and police 
vigilante justice often overlaps.  An example is the case of the Carandiru massacre during 
1993, which I mentioned previously.  For example, when the police violate the civil 
rights of suspected criminals, the public tends to have little reaction because they believe 
that violence and such extrajudicial killings are justified and even a legitimate reaction 
and punishment.  According to Caldeira, the people are “…usually asking the police, 
whose violence they fear, to take violent action against the side that deserves it…their 
rationale is clear: once dead, criminals no longer pose a threat.” (Caldeira, 2001; 192) 
From a paradigmatic analysis, this certainly reflects the more traditional approach to 
criminal rights.  It is somewhat of an irony, according to Nancy Cardia, that violence and 
its arbitrary nature increases the citizen’s distrust of the police yet this does not promote 
police reform among the general population.  Ironically, it is this very violence that 
increases the tolerance to police violence. (Cardia, 1997)  It seems that the increase in 
support for police violence is not because the public believes it is ideally desirable but 
rather a necessary response for the safety of the public.  In a 1998 study by the Center for 
the Study of Violence at the State University of São Paulo, 95 percent of Paulistas and 88 
percent of Rio de Janeiro residents believed that violence is increasing in their cities. 
(Cardia, 1999) In fact, “in Brazil’s major cities, homicide is the leading cause of death 
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among 15-24 year-olds.  Rio de Janeiro ranks among one of the world’s most violent 
cities. São Paulo…has just been racked by a severe wave of violence that had killed over 
150 people- 40 of them police officers.” (Beato, 2006) In trying to find additional 
information about gender, class, and race differences in support for violence, I used and 
sorted 2008/2009 data from the National Institute for the Study of Violence (NEV-
CEPID/FAPESP) study.  A study conducted in 2008 and 2009 by The Violence Project at 
the University of São Paulo, found that support for citizen vigilant justice, there was 
some difference between age and class but no difference racially.  In regards to support 
for retributive violence, there was no difference between the genders but certainly 
differences in race and class.  The more people earned, regardless of race, the more likely 
they were to support tougher police enforcement and even violence when necessary to 
protect themselves and their neighborhood.   Finally, when looking at support for 
procedural violence, there was no difference between the genders, but here was some 
class based differences and certainly racial differences. (Adorno, Cardia, & Pinheiro, 
2001) 
 A strong civil rights culture has developed in Brazil but in a rather peculiar way 
where civil rights often apply only to those people who deserve them by contributing 
positively and correctly to society.  It is also quite clear that many in Brazil hold negative 
beliefs about civil rights and their very legitimacy.  This is the case because of increasing 
concerns about rising crime and violence, which still seems to act as a barrier towards 
constructing a more inclusive civil rights regime in Brazil.  As anthropologist Roberto Da 
Matta stated, “the notion of…equality for all is problematic and provokes attempts to 
restore hierarchy by violence.” (DaMatta, 1991; 133) 
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Conclusions and the Future 
Caldeira (2001) found that having a personal fear of crime affects how a person speaks 
about criminals and what they believe in regards to civil rights for criminals more 
generally.  In the psychological realm, studies have shown that a fear of crime is seen as a 
negative reaction to unsafe environmental conditions.  According to James Lane, 
measures of the fear of crime can encompass both a “cognitive assessment of perceived 
risk and an affective assessment of fear.” (Lane & Meeker, 2003; 26) Some researchers 
believe that these components should be studied separately but what I focused on in this 
research is the fear of crime. 
 The traditional civil rights paradigm, which views some persons as being more 
deserving of civil rights protection than others, appears to be the default paradigm when 
looking at Brazil.  It is grounded in and fits well with the authoritarian legacy that is 
prevalent in Brazil.  This commonly seen hierarchical power relationship between people 
is of utmost current and historical importance in Brazil and cannot be discounted when 
doing this type of research.  As Christian Staerkle noted, “if a person’s civil rights are to 
be supported as inalienable, his or her deservingness of civil rights protection must be 
disassociated from his or her acts or personal characteristics.” (Clemence & Staerkle, 
200; 389) Within the civil rights paradigms that I have discussed and evaluated in this 
essay, information about a criminal’s race, social class, and criminal actions are certainly 
used to justify the withholding of civil rights protection.  Because the belief that all 
people are worthy of civil rights protection is a major defining feature of the emerging 
civil rights paradigm, public policies are needed which focus on encouraging people’s 
attitudes to change regarding extralegal police violence while still working towards a 
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better domestic security regime.  Within this emerging civil rights paradigm, it is 
certainly possible to support the extension of civil rights to criminals without supporting 
their criminality.  Clearly, those individuals and policy makers that adopt this worldview 
are less likely to support retributive or procedural violence by the police.  While this 
research only begins to look at the data available, I believe it possible to conclude that the 
fear of crime, which is associated with increased victimization and the presence of 
incivilities, acts as a barrier to adopting this emerging type of civil rights paradigm.  
Public support for extralegal police violence is a barrier to building a stronger and more 
entrenched culture of peace in Brazil. (DaMatta, 1991)  The government policy makers 
are clearly trying different strategies in order to address the crime problem in Brazil.  As 
with any policy, it is malleable and constantly changing based on the needs and attitudes 
of the public.   
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CHAPTER 5: VIOLENCE AND THE BATTLE FOR BRAZIL’S FUTURE 	  
With Brazil’s economy booming and its international prowess stronger than ever, coupled 
with fact that the country will be hosting two global sporting events in the next decade, 
the security situation within its borders is an important both domestically in Brazil as well 
as to the outside world.  It is now all the more appropriate to look at how the successive 
governments of both Presidents Lula Da Silva and Dilma Rousseff have and intend to 
combat violence and crime.  Certainly, the task they have is a large one as it involves not 
only Brazilians battling other Brazilians but also involves organs of the state killing, 
endangering, and battling their own people.  There are no easy solutions, but progress has 
been seen in numerous areas.  Now, some areas of Brazilian cities that were controlled by 
drug gangs and militias are once again under government control. To say the cost of 
battling this violence has been high is a understatement, yet only through lasting 
structural change and a deepening public arena for debate can this problem be solved.  In 
this chapter, I will be looking at numerous methods and proposals that have been 
employed to slow down and  reverse the menace of violence in modern Brazil. 
 If the largest city in Brazil, São Paulo, is used a background example, over 5,400 
people were killed by the military and civilian police forces in just ten years from 1997 to 
2007. (Alves & Vargas, 2010; 614) State sanctioned violence, as police inflicted killings 
are classified according to Joao Vargas, is termed an “index of the precariousness of 
substantive citizenship, and the ways in which citizenship- or rather the lack of it- is 
inflicted by and is reflected in the spatialization of race, gender, and class.” (Alves & 
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Vargas, 2010, 613)  There is ample evidence that the Brazilian government is working 
hard to address these inequalities and beginning to tackle the spiraling levels of violence 
within its borders. However, despite these efforts, in the past twenty years the number of 
murders in Brazil has increased 237 percent. Research published by the United States 
Department of State indicated that every year more than 40,000 people lose their lives in 
Brazil by being victims of violence. This represents 11 percent of violence victims on the 
planet. (U.S. Department of State, 2007) As recently as November 24, 2010 the police 
raided more than a dozen slums in Rio de Janeiro.  This was an all out effort by the state 
and federal government to quell violent attacks by gangs that have raised questions about 
security in the city chosen to host the 2014 World Cup and the 2016 Olympic Games, Rio 
de Janiero.   As Myrna Domit reported, “heavily armed criminals have blocked busy 
streets, robbed drivers and burned at least nine cars since Sunday, according to the police 
and the Brazilian news media. The Rio State secretary of public security, José Mariano 
Beltrame, said the attacks “were a retaliation by gang members for a government 
program to pacify violent slums, in part by installing a special community police force.” 
(Domit, 2010; A10) 
 According to data provided by the World Health Organization (WHO), Brazil had 
the second highest per capita rate of mortality from aggravated murder in the world, 
being behind only Colombia, a country that was embroiled in a civil war for over three 
decades. (Pan American Health Organization- Country Profile Brazil, 2009) Despite, or 
maybe because of these astonishing numbers, Brazil has an average of one policeman for 
every 304 inhabitants, which is a comparable ratio to the developed European 
democracies such as Germany or the United Kingdom.  The total Brazilian police force 
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has a combined strength of 535,244 policemen.  This includes the federally controlled 
policing bodies that are comprised of the military and civil police, fire, and federal 
protective police organizations.   
 These multiple organizations are often overlapping in their jurisdictional areas 
and have been proven inefficient. In addition to their overlapping functions, the forces are 
geographically distributed in a confusing and unequal manner.  As an example, there are 
26 states in Brazil yet 55 percent of police officers are housed in only five states   These 
states, São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Minas Gerais, Bahia and Rio Grande do Sul, are the 
largest in total population but certainly do not warrant 55 percent of Brazil’s total police 
being concentrated in those areas. (Campos, 2005)  In order to consolidate gains that have 
been made, the Federal Government of Brazil needs to not only streamline its security 
regime but also better distribute officers to where they are needed most.  In addition, 
money must be better spent on crime prevention along with reforms that will increase the 
transparency of the judiciary. 
 In what is the most telltale sign of the perceived lack of security in Brazil’s public 
sphere, thousands of new private security companies have been created in order to protect 
the more affluent from harm. This further exacerbates the erosion of citizen participation 
in public spaces.  In the year 2000, for example, the Brazilian government reported the 
existence of 1,368 private security firms; by 2004 the number of security firms had more 
than doubled.  Over 833,361 security guards were employed in these firms, which meant 
that there were 60 percent more private security guards than sworn police officers in 
Brazil in 2004, a huge change in just four years. (Campos, 2005)   These figures are from 
official records and do not include unofficial security officers working in the gray market.  
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Most often, these vigilante private guards do not exercise the same restraint and lack the 
training of the professional police though they are paid in a more lucrative fashion.  In 
this case, money buys security and security is exactly what is desired most by the 
residents of major Brazilian cities, who feel unsafe in the public domain.  The pay for 
official policeman is low and they are mainly from the lower classes, causing another set 
of problems in itself. 
 It is impossible to speak of urban violence without mentioning guns and their 
owners, both legal and illegal.  The government has also tried to implement reforms on 
this issue.  To this effect, firearms in Brazil are required to be registered with the state 
and the minimum age for ownership is 25.  Although it is legal to carry a gun outside a 
private residence, there are extremely severe restrictions, which were instituted by the 
federal government in 2002, making it virtually impossible to obtain a weapons permit. 
(Campos, 2005)  To legally own a gun, the owner must pay a tax every three years to 
register the gun, which is currently at R$60.00 and the registration can be done via the 
Internet or in person with the Federal Military Police.  Until the end of the 2008 grace 
period, unregistered guns could be legalized for free but this is no longer in effect.  With 
this amnesty, the state finally was able to accurately figure out the number of weapons in 
the country. The National Arms System Database Sistema Nacional de Armas (SINARM) 
estimates that there are around 17 million weapons in Brazil with 9 million of those being 
unregistered. (Campos, 2005) 
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Armed Forces as a Policing Alternative 
There has always been a debate in Brazilian society about whether or not the armed 
forces should be used to combat urban violence.  This debate becomes more acute when a 
crime wave hits or violence spirals out of control.  In this light, it is important to note that 
these military organizations are permanent institutions and thus organized on the basis of 
hierarchy and discipline, and have as their mission the defense of national sovereignty, 
safeguarding constitutional power and, when requested in emergency situations, to 
maintain law and order.   As such, the military has no defined or permanent police power.  
Given this situation, the military should not be employed for public safety functions that 
combat social movements and organized crime, for example.  They also are not trained 
for combat against their own citizenry in an urban atmosphere.  Clearly, the concepts of 
public security and national defense should not be intermingled.  While some in Brazil 
believe that drastic action needs to be taken in order to combat urban violence, there are 
many tactical, political, and operational reasons why the military is not an option. 
 When looking empirically at the Brazilian military forces, the Army has a 
headcount of 202,993 soldiers, 65,043 in the Air Force, and the Navy has 61,067 
members.  In a traditional paradigm, the function of the state has been to provide security 
to its citizens, assuring them of their moral and physical safety and thus enable the 
reflection of a peaceful and harmonious coexistence among individuals. (Shirley, 1987)  
There is not a natural fit for the Brazilian Armed forces to act as an internal policing 
authority.  Though it might seem to be an effective and expedient way to solve the 
violence problem in Brazil, the armed forces are not a practical solution to this problem. 
 84  
As the rule of law and its application has changed over time, police power has had 
imposed limitations and its functioning has changed accordingly.  Police power, which 
incorporates social values, has come to be defined in legal terms as: "... the State's 
administrative activity that aims to limit and constrain the exercise of freedoms and 
individual rights in order to ensure, on a level capable of preserving public order, the 
fulfillment of minimum values of social harmony, especially safety, health, the decorum 
and aesthetics." (DaMatta, 1991; 143) As new concepts of public safety take place, a 
novel consensus has established itself and now is defined more accurately as "the absence 
of disturbance and harmonious arrangement of social relations.” (DaMatta, 1991; 154)  
So, public safety has been conceptualized as a guarantee of internal public order, in other 
words, public safety must be guaranteed by the State of a social life free from the threat 
of violence, allowing everyone the enjoyment of their rights guaranteed by the Brazilian 
Constitution, through the exercise of police power.  While this right of a public sphere 
free from violence is guaranteed in theory, it is not the reality in Brazil.  It might seem 
tempting to use the armed forces as a policing authority, but its long-term effectiveness is 
certainly doubtful.  Structural and societal problems need to be address before looking to 
the military as a legitimate and effective guarantor of internal security in the long run. 
 
The State’s Budgetary Response and Reformation 
The growth of violence is also being affected by budget cuts on the local, state, and the 
federal level.  With less money, there are fewer resources to invest in law enforcement 
and other social services.  According to Nancy Cardia, “even in the 1960’s and 1970’s, 
when Brazil had high rates of economic growth, the state devoted few resources nor had 
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the political will to control or oversee its law enforcement agents.” (Cardia, 2001, 9)  For 
Brazil, until quite recently, the economic situation has been difficult at best.  During that 
time, this lack of control that the state exerted on the part of its law enforcement officials 
has encouraged further violence and corruption on the part of its police agents.  In the 
end, the state has and still fails to protect all its citizens.  The Brazilian government had 
also failed to prevent violence by encouraging economic growth, providing a social 
safety network, effective law enforcement, improving the criminal justice system, and 
reducing selective impunity. (O’Donnell, 1993) 
 The criminal justice system has also been affected by budget cuts on many levels 
including cuts to the court system, the police, and the office of the public prosecutors.  As 
such, there are fewer people than ever before fighting crime yet it has risen exponentially 
in recent years.  In addition, the wages for many of these officials are lower than in the 
private sector and this often breeds corruption. Additionally, salary distortions are 
rampant, which is problematic in Brazil. For example, federal judges have a starting 
salary of 20,000 Reals per month, while lower ranking employees make on average only 
3,000 Reals per month. Besides low wages, there is inadequate equipment and 
technology in the legal system so many prosecutors rely on twenty year-old computers or 
no automation at all.  This has the unfortunate effect of making an inefficient system even 
slower in response time.  Compounding this is a total lack of accountability that the 
system has to the public as a few elite officials often make decisions.  So much so that 
many lower level employees have no input whatsoever.  This asymmetric decision-
making process further has the effect of undermining the public’s faith in the system.  
Additionally, “(the) institutional problem is the availability of local democratic practices 
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and the inability of social actors to think about institutional designs capable of 
strengthening them.” (Avritzer, 2002; 57) 
Another problem that is seen in the Brazilian justice system is what is called wage 
asymmetry.  The existing resources that are available are distributed in an extremely 
unequal fashion.  For example, within the military police, salaries at the top ranks can be 
20 times more than that of the lower ranks. (Cardia, 2001)  Within the judiciary itself, as 
an additional example, budgetary matters are mostly left to top-level judges so that there 
is little public oversight.  Among the public prosecutor’s office, the judiciary, and the 
police, there are often demands for salary equality but this has fallen on deaf ears.  In 
many cases, people doing the same work are paid differently according to whom they 
work for and in what department.  This animosity is bad for Brazilian justice and bad for 
the systems functioning as a whole.  Finally, resources are not distributed across the 
regions according to need but rather because of the political power of their 
representatives.  According to Nancy Cardia, “since 1991, it has been well known that 
violent crime is concentrated in certain regions of the São Paulo metro area; yet despite 
these reports, these areas continue to be the least policed…In 1996, a study revealed that 
downtown São Paulo had one police officer for every 250 inhabitants and one police car 
for every 2,083 inhabitants. In the most violent areas of the periphery the ratio was one 
officer for every 1,429 inhabitants and one police car for every 10,000 people.” (Cardia, 
2001; 10) Clearly, this is not an effective or practical distribution in a city like São Paulo 
that so needs an effective public security system.  This is precisely where violence, the 
police, democracy, and inequality come together. In a democracy, there shouldn’t be such 
a huge delta between people and policing.  Policing should logically be denser and more 
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visible in violent areas. For example, the total ratio of police to inhabitants does not 
provide an accurate depiction of what goes on. It rather appears that some neighborhoods 
have more policing by ratio than in Western Europe while others have much less than in 
the most basic societies.  This inefficient distribution of policing resources only further 
exaggerates the problem of violence and its subsequent control in Brazil. 
 The Federal Government of Brazil must rethink its responsibility for the 
management of efficient public policies in the area of public safety.  This cannot happen 
unless there is a strong autonomous body created with its primary responsibility being the 
development and implementation of national security and policing policy.  Many experts, 
like Claudio Beato, believe that it simply does not seem reasonable that the National 
Secretariat of Public Security should continue to operate as a division of the Ministry of 
Justice.  (Beato, 2006)  This structure means that its efforts and energy are divided 
between National Indigenous Fund Fundação Nacional do Índio (FUNAI), which is 
responsible for indigenous affairs and the Administrative Council for Economic Defense 
Conselho Administrativo de Defensa Econômica (CADE), which... “in light of the 
domestic security situation in Brazil, the organs of public safety merit a proper ministry, 
one dedicated solely to combating violence and implementing national security policies.   
Public safety is the responsibility of the government and it also has the obligation to 
protect its citizens under article 144 of the Brazilian constitution.” (Beato, 2006; 19)  
There is some movement towards a structural change as President Rousseff indicated she 
would “support a consolidation of functions under a new or consolidated ministry by 
2012.”  (Domit, 2009; A10) 
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Conclusion 
In Brazil, violence and crime have been frightening to the populations of major cities, yet 
it seems these events are not undermining totally Brazilian democracy.  One explanation 
for this lies in the perception that crime and violence are limited to only major urban 
centers. Indeed, despite the brutality of and wide publicity about urban crime, violence is 
not perceived as widespread, but rather as a local phenomenon peculiar only to some 
cities.   As is evident from the research I have presented, this is not the case as the 
violence and crime in Brazil is spread throughout the land.  As a consequence, Brazilians 
who do not live in major cities often feel shocked by the information on violence 
presented in the national media.  Furthermore, Brazilian citizens have generally been 
what I would term as cautious in what they demand from their democratic 
administrations. Apparently due to historical reasons and democratization still freshly in 
their collective memory, the populace still avoids demanding too much from civilian 
administrations because they fear that excessive pressure could break the current order 
and lead to an authoritarian setback. Therefore, from the political standpoint, Brazilian 
democracy does not seem threatened by crime and urban violence. 
  The deterioration of urban public safety in Brazil is rooted in a combination of 
causes. Poverty, and especially the huge gap existing between the rich and poor, creates a 
fertile environment where drug dealers circulate and establish areas of influence. The 
lack of respect for the state’s enforcement apparatus, which is plagued by violence, poor 
training, inadequate structures, and corruption, lends a perception of impunity that both 
promotes and trivializes criminal acts. In addition, the inequity, dramatized by the close 
proximity of the richest to the poorest classes in urban centers so aptly analyzed and 
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researched by Caldeira, underscores the injustice of the situation and renders an air of 
legitimacy to crime. State initiatives to address the problems must therefore be 
comprehensive, address specific social demands, and combine regional and federal 
enforcement efforts in a coordinated manner. 
 As new administrations come into power, the reforms that were proposed or even 
instituted by the previous administration are jettisoned.  This lack of continuity breeds a 
further erosion of public trust that anything can or will be done in the arena of public 
security reform.  As I mentioned previously, mass media also “…contributes to the social 
problem…by feeding into the culture of fear and distrust that permeates Latin American 
society in general.” (Beato, 2006; 5)  In the end, crime is caused by a multitude of factors 
and no one answer is sufficient in explaining Brazil’s extreme urban violence problem.  I 
have explored these issues in my research as well as some possible solutions.  Regardless, 
what is needed now is a better understanding of the root causes of violence and how the 
issues can be addressed most effectively and in a timely manner.  These problems will 
not go away and it is incumbent upon Brazilian society to formulate an answer to the 
scourge of violence plaguing it.  As Claudio Beato wrote, “What is indisputable, 
however, is the urgent need for greater social accountability to deal with the troubling 
absence in the political sphere of the will to tackle the problem…and (what needs to 
occur is) a rethinking on the part of the country as a whole as to how individual actions 
strengthen or weaken the rule of law.” (Beato, 2006; 7)  As Brazil prepares to host both 
the World Cup and Summer Olympics in its most violent city, all eyes will be on the 
country.  It will be up to Brazil’s new government under Dilma Rousseff to finally solve 
the dual problems of violence and crime in Brazil.  While that task is monumental in 
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itself, the underlying causes of these problems including racism, inequality, and 
inefficient government make the Brazilian reality difficult to understand let alone try to 
solve.  What is, perhaps, the best tact is to start at the base level and bring prosperity to 
more people.  Whether or not unregulated capitalism is allowed to manifest in Brazil 
remains to be seen.  The fact is that for democracy to be fully consolidated, the public 
sphere must again be reopened for debate and, at the most basic level, living.  Brazilians 
should not live in a bubble but rather alongside each other, whether rich or poor.  This 
fear and rich versus poor mentality, has for too long undermined the quality of Brazilian 
democracy.   
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION 	  
Brazil, the largest and most populous country in South America has continued to pursue 
economic growth since 1822, when it obtained its independence from Portugal. Endowed 
with some of the most abundant and valuable natural resources in the world, Brazil has 
managed to exploit the large labor pool it possesses to become the leading economic 
power in South America and a regional leader in many aspects. Its growth, development, 
and economic stability were evident when it assumed a short-term seat on the United 
Nations Security Council running from 2010-2011. In addition to its political prowess, 
the country has featured more prominently in the world arena, contributing heavily to 
resolving international disputes.  In the near future, the country is expected to feature 
even more prominently on the world stage with the 2014 world cup and the subsequent 
summer Olympics being held in Rio de Janeiro. This is the first time such high profile 
events are being held in Latin America making this a very prestigious achievement.   It is 
important to note the fact that crime and unequal income distribution have remained 
major problems in Brazil. These highlights clearly illustrate the importance of assessing 
and analyzing the nature of violence in the Brazilian society.  
This work is aimed at demonstrating how violence affects diverse groups in 
different ways. The empirical realities of violence in Brazil are shocking and policy 
experts have insisted on addressing the underlying basis for violence in the country. 
Different organizations have been involved in this study, notably being the University of 
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São Paulo Violence Project and the Woodrow Wilson International Center, which 
sponsored “The Brazil Project” in 2006 aimed at identifying the causes, consequences, 
and solutions to violence and extreme urban crime problem in the country. (Filho, 2006) 
Discussed in this symposium was the efficiency of the traditional policing and crime-
fighting techniques used but which have definitely failed. I analyzed new alternatives of 
policing, which included innovative police responses, targeted policing, and police 
community partnerships. The social and psychological impact of Brazil’s powerful and 
sensationalist media, which has managed to promote fear among citizens in order to gain 
more profits.  This research exposes some of the major details of violence and of the 
utmost importance in finding solutions to it. Only through collective and sustained effort 
can Brazil become a more equitable place, which is safe and prosperous for all residents.  
 According to 2002 statistics, one in every 20 citizens was a victim of violence or 
armed robberies depicting by the rate of 1,704 incidences per day, (Filho, 2006) reaching 
its peak in 2003 when the Brazil’s Ministry of Health reported a homicide level of 28.9 
per 1000 inhabitants. Violence has been blamed on the rising level of social inequalities 
and rate of unemployment. This has subsided, somewhat, in the last five years due to 
anti-poverty programs instituted by President Da Silva, which brought millions of people 
into the middle class. Although all social groups are affected by violence, the poor have 
been blamed resulting in a public perception that the poor are a “dangerous class”. This is 
not the case as there has been existence of a rather disturbing trend of crimes involving 
killing of journalists, judges, mayors, and union leaders among others clearly indicating 
the presence of organized gangs and collaboration of powerful groups or individuals like 
business people and politicians.  
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Looking at one facet of violence in Brazil like homicide, Brazil has recorded some of the 
most alarming figures. In 2001 for example, the number of homicides in Rio de Janeiro 
was estimated to be 59 per 100,000 inhabitants while the same rose to 200 per 100,000 
inhabitants when the population of the poor was evaluated as an individual group. 
(Caldeira, 2000)  These rates surpass those of countries considered “crisis countries” like 
Sierra Leon, Colombia, and Iraq. These statistics shows how Brazil is a dangerous 
country to live in. Criminal gangs are by no means few in number in Brazil and they have 
continually acted with renewed brazenness. A good example is the 2006 First Capital 
Command Primeiro Comando da Capital incident, which orchestrated a series of bomb 
attacks and assassinations aimed at law enforcement officers in the city of São Paulo 
from jailed criminals. This criminal and terrorist gang coordinated various attacks in the 
city, which resulted to over 160 deaths. The gang has many followers and is active in all 
Brazilian state prisons and has even hired lawyers to act on their behalf.   
 The fact is that many middle and upper class individuals believe that they had to 
abandon the “public sphere.”  The excluded and the included share limited interactions 
with each other and there are many differences on how they live, spend their leisure time, 
and how they work.  In many Brazilian cities, the landscape is drastically changing, 
leading to a pattern of spatial segregation according to Caldeira (2000).   The middle and 
upper classes have their own public spaces, transport networks, and even schools.  The 
poor often have to make do with the badly financed public sector transport systems, 
public’s hospitals, and the deplorable public education system.  All in all, they exist in 
completely separate spheres, thus undermining the very idea of a shared public realm, 
where public matters can be discussed freely, among the citizens of a democracy. 
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Together with a discredited state that is perceived by many as corrupt and serving only 
the interests of the rich and privileged, the lack of an inclusive public sphere threatens the 
quality of Brazilian democracy and creates a problem of democratic legitimacy. When 
citizens fall into first and second-class categories, where the first-class perceives the state 
as an instrument to further their own private interests, while the poor find no access to 
their civil rights, and where public discourse and deliberation is made impossible by a 
real or perceived threat of violence and insecurity – then democracy is at risk.   
According to Claudio Beato (2006), targeted policing and police reform are the 
most needed and effective measures in addressing the severe problem of violence in 
Brazil. Violence, which was originally confined historically to rural areas, has swiftly 
spread to all major cities of the country making Brazil the most violent state in Latin 
America. Beato observed that there is need for the government’s increased crime tackling 
abilities adopting measures aimed at redirecting security forces to the major areas. This 
researcher also observed the connection between violence and its consequences. This 
study revealed that violence and crime was not spread evenly over the country, but rather 
a type of violence implosion where 10 percent of these crimes can clearly be traced to 
just eight census divisions out of the 2500 divisions in the whole country with 40 percent 
violent crimes being intense in just 10 percent of census tracks. (Beato, 2006) 
Concentration of violence is also based on some specific features, which include terrible 
social conditions characterized by poor infrastructure, low levels of education, and high 
childhood mortality. These observations led to Beato to suggest that if security forces 
were redirected into those areas where crime is rife, meaningful progress would be easily 
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observed. (Beato, 2006) The type of policing applied here should also be result oriented 
policing where innovative techniques are utilized to subdue crime.  
The hot spots of crime should not be avoided and the police should cooperate with 
the residents and work with that collaborative attitude and mutual respect to come up 
with meaningful ways of reducing violence.  Beato proposed the use of both a scientific 
and rational approach by the police in order to better deploy their resources in terms of 
personnel and equipment so that they can be in a position to target crime more effectively 
given the limited resources available. (Beato, 2006) Belo Horizonte’s civic police and 
military applied these measures and obtained promising results. The city recorded the 
greatest decline in crime in two decades with a decline of 18 percent. He also proposed a 
mechanism of poverty reduction and establishment of social development programs to 
fight crime from the source or the causes. (Beato, 2006) 
 Among the poor residents who live in the favelas, it is perceived that the drug 
lords are the good guys. These drug lords act as a role model for the youth due to the gold 
chains they wear and the flashy cars they drive thus nurturing the wrong perspective 
among these youths. Ironically, law enforcement officers like the military police, are seen 
as the bad guys by these very same people (Beato, 2006). This perspective has developed 
over the years due to the nature of police brutality and the fact that they stir up violence 
every time they enter the favelas to flush the drug lords out. Many of Brazil’s poor have 
the habit of not trusting the police and this has led to a flawed system that heavily 
contributes to the overall level of lawlessness in the country.  The police on the other 
hand have given these poor people a reason to distrust them. They apply excessive force, 
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harassment, and crude methods when dealing with them in the homes up in the hills 
where the favelas are located. 
Luis Bitencourt observed that police reform must be a major and necessary 
change alongside government reform to relieve Brazil’s endemic poverty if the end result 
is minimizing and ending violence in the country (Bitencourt, 2009). The judicial system 
will also needs thorough modernization along with the state’s penal system so as to clean 
up the system as a whole and establish smoothly running structures and improve 
efficiency at all levels. Given the fact that violence affects all social classes, the 
politicians are not immune and they often must be coerced into solving these problems 
(Bitencourt, 2009). When looking at the domestic security regime, the country needs a 
less politicized police force.  This can be achieved through establishment of a better 
political system. The government should stop investing so much on research and 
rhetorical solutions to this problem, when they are not ready to implement the research 
findings. A lot of information regarding the causes and solutions to this problem of 
violence has been availed through different studies, but more often than not few 
politicians are willing to go the extra mile to invest in the implementation of these 
findings.  Brazil has a history where modernization and industrialization were pursued at 
the expense of recognizing the limits of Latin American culture.  Avritzer stated, 
“modernization theory has been unable to theorize the political implications of the 
encounter between the structures of political rationality proper to the West and Latin 
American societies.” (Avritzer, 2002; 63) In the end, this is the biggest area where the 
government of Brazil is failing its citizenry.  This is also the area that needs to be 
developed so that a robust democracy that includes a safe and viable public sphere is able 
 97  
to develop in Brazil.  To do this, Brazil must engage its public sphere more robustly than 
ever before.  Instead of shunning it poor and marginalized, Brazil must look to its favelas, 
as President Obama said, to provide “future leaders, artists, politicians, businessmen, and 
those with ideas to move Brazil forward in the next century.” (Obama, 2011)  If Brazil 
can reopen its public spaces for debate and provide a more robust and accessible public 
forum for debate, then democracy will truly be consolidated and violence will no longer 
be a menace to Brazil. 
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